While humanitarians might demur, how could anyone disagree with this as the most prudent way to advance a nation’s welfare? My answer: Anyone who grasps Econ 1 should abjure these slogans as utter nonsense.

Let’s start with Papa John’s itself. Do they use “the best ingredients”? The Pizza Hut v. Papa John’s (2000) lawsuit rather conclusively demonstrated that Papa John’s ingredients were not even better than its competitors’, much less “the best.” Specifically:

Tomato sauce: Papa John’s advertised that its sauce came directly from processed fresh tomatoes, while competitors used tomato paste mixed with water. Although this accurately reflected differences in manufacturing, the trial court found no measurable difference in the finished sauces that justified the implication of superior quality.

Pizza dough: Papa John’s emphasized that it used unfrozen, slowly fermented dough, whereas much of Pizza Hut’s dough was frozen. The trial court found no convincing scientific evidence that Papa John’s method produced superior pizza crust.

Water: Papa John’s advertised its use of filtered water, contrasting it with Pizza Hut’s tap water. The court rejected the implication that municipal water was inferior.

Taste tests: Papa John’s advertised victories over Pizza Hut, but the trial court found that its presentation misleadingly exaggerated the results.

How then has Papa John’s made its way in the pizza marketplace? The usual way: Offering an attractive package of price, quality, and convenience. Almost no one sincerely thinks that Papa John’s pizza is supremely delicious; the trial court explicitly ruled that this slogan was mere “puffery” that consumers should not take as a literal statement of fact. They eat it in mass quantities because, like almost every other mass-market product, it’s good enough.

Why, though, doesn’t any major pizza producer sincerely embrace the slogan that Papa John’s itself fails to follow? Simple: They’d lose a pile of money. While a few pizza parlors try to carve out a tiny niche of ultra-premium pizza, the vast majority of consumers happily sacrifice quality for price. I don’t want to pay $200 per pizza. Do you?

The same goes for the labor market. Firms might claim they only want to hire the best workers, but no firm sincerely acts on this puffery. The highest-tech firms in the world still hire all sorts of employees who are decidedly mid-skilled or low-skilled: secretaries, accountants, handymen, security guards, plumbers, janitors, gardeners, and beyond. And the are wise to do so: For the vast majority of jobs, the best of the best is absurd overkill. Adequate will do. Who needs a janitor with a 130 IQ?

The extension to immigration is straightforward. Limiting yourself to the “best people” may sound good, but it’s economically illiterate nonsense. Sophistry on stilts. Speaking purely prudentially, you want everyone who is better than nothing. Mathematically: E(X)>0. As I wrote in my open letter to Elon Musk:

You could reply: “Fine, but only very high-skilled immigrants have E(X)>0.” But look at your own companies. You don’t just hire top engineers and programmers. You hire receptionists, assembly-line workers, janitors, gardeners, and construction workers. With good reason: Otherwise, your top engineers and programmers would have to waste their precious time answering Tesla’s phones, assembling its cars, cleaning its toilets, mowing its lawns, and pouring its concrete.

Moreover:

This isn’t just true on the job; it’s true inside the household. Your top engineers and programmers are only able to work 80-hour weeks because they can hire nannies and maids, ride in Ubers, and order food delivery. High-skill productivity depends on an abundance of complementary low-skill productivity.

And:

The vast majority of humans who are “hard-working, honest, and love America” are not top engineers and programmers - or even in the top half of GRE scores. Especially globally, these stars are vastly outnumbered by ordinary, humble people with E(X)>0. Your company needs them — and your country needs them.

Just as it is economically illiterate to insist that pizza parlors produce only top-notch pizzas, it is economically illiterate to insist that countries admit only top-notch immigrants. The path of wisdom, rather, is to make the humblest pizzas and admit the humblest immigrants, so long as they have positive net value. Even the dried-out airport pizzas. Even the illiterate Afghan goat-herders. Just because you don’t see their value doesn’t mean that they aren’t worthwhile to someone. A hungry traveler whose flight got cancelled wants that dried-out pizza. An Afghan restaurant wants that monolingual Dari-speaker dishwasher.

You can always claim, of course, that low-skilled immigrants (or any immigrants) have negative externalities awful enough to swamp their labor market contributions. But our ability to catastrophize does not make catastrophe credible. As a rule, employers avoid hiring workers who generate negative externalities, because ground zero for those externalities is the workplace itself. If a certain kind of applicant is crime-prone, unpleasant, lazy, insubordinate, or just plain freaky, employers take that into account in their hiring decisions. And while it is logically possible to be a model worker but a terrible citizen, this configuration is highly implausible. The burden of proof justly lies on the accuser.

Addendum: At our Austin debate, Garett wished for an influx of immigrant brainpower sufficient to raise our national IQ by 3-6 points. Even if they made up 20% of the population, the immigrants would have to have an average IQ between 116 (for 3 points) to 134 (for six points). At our recent follow-up debate in Wyoming, I had the opportunity to ask Garett why the cutoff should be so high. Why not, per his own work, at least gladly welcome everyone who raises average IQ, which in the U.S. stands at 98?

He offered two candid answers.

1. With family unification policies, an immigrant with an IQ of 98 could still lead to the chain migration of many immigrants whose immigrants are less than 98.

2. Due to chronic deficits, the average American is a net fiscal burden, so you have to be far above average to be a fiscal positive.

I appreciate the responses, yet I’m unimpressed. Reply:

1. For countries with average IQs over 98, you should expect (via mean regression) the chain migrants to actually be smarter than the original migrant.

2. Furthermore, due to high correlations of both blood and marriage relatives, this is a second-order issue even for migrants from places with average IQ is less than ours.

3. Chronic deficits show that the average American is a fiscal burden, but not the marginal American! Does anyone seriously expect crashing fertility to make the U.S. debt crisis less severe?! No, because so much government spending in non-rival.

4. In any case, this is an excellent illustration of the fact that a person’s fiscal contribution to the government drastically understates his overall contribution to society. A person can easily pay zero taxes yet still generate piles of consumer surplus for his customers and producer surplus for his employers.

5. At the meta-level: Even if American voters and politicians stubbornly insist on making otherwise productive people into net negatives, it is perverse to get angry at immigrants or their defenders. If you’re going to be angry at anyone, get angry at normies. Though it’s probably best not to get angry at all.

1. Rothbard’s Rejectionism

After leading with the theory of perfect competition, economics textbooks standardly add a “corrective” chapter on the evils of monopoly. While they occasionally mention government-created monopoly, the focus is almost always on the harm of free-market monopoly, and the necessity of antitrust laws to combat such monopoly. A free-market monopoly is a business that manages to control a whole industry, and uses its control to slash output and raise prices. Later textbook chapters move on to markets with varying degrees of “monopoly power” – and broadly conclude that as monopoly power goes up, market performance goes down. The moral: Free markets are only optimal in an extreme polar case. The further the real world strays from that case, the more suboptimal they become – and the more regulation improves the free-market outcome.

Murray Rothbard rejects this picture, using three different sets of arguments. (Rothbard 2009) First, he maintains that textbook monopoly theory is literal nonsense. On the free market, there is no coherent way to distinguish a monopoly price from a competitive price. Second, he argues that the size and number of firms is an optimal response to economies of scale and consumer demand. When economies of scale are low and consumer demand is high, you optimally get a lot of small firms; when economies of scale are high and consumer demand is low, you optimally get a few large firms. Finally, Rothbard maintains that when firms have tried to gain free-market monopolies via collusion or predation, economic history shows that they reliably failed. The best check on free-market monopoly is the free market itself. (Rothbard 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d)

In this essay, I critically assess Rothbard’s critique of the textbook account. His first and most fundamental argument – that textbook monopoly theory is literal nonsense – is not only false. It contradicts his third argument. How can history “show” that market forces prevent free-market monopoly if free-market monopoly is impossible by definition? His second and third arguments, however, are very strong. Free competition works far better than “perfect” competition. Market structure is indeed a functional response to costs and demand. The main way firms gain and maintain monopolies on the free market is by doing an exceptionally good job of controlling costs and pleasing consumers. When they try to gain and maintain monopoly by the alternate path of collusion and predation, they rarely succeed for long. So while Rothbard’s most original contribution to monopoly theory is wrong, bordering on crackpottish, his pro-market, anti-government vision is fundamentally sound and wise.

2. The “Illusion” of Monopoly Price

[…]

But it is Rothbard’s critique that is utterly fallacious. Horizontal demand curves are not only logically possible; we commonly observe them. Have you ever managed to sell additional hours of your time without cutting your price? Then you have personally experienced horizontal labor demand.

More fundamentally, even if horizontal demand were impossible, it is still perfectly coherent to claim that monopoly power decreases as demand gets closer to horizontal. Rothbard specifically denies this:

We cannot compare or classify the curves on the basis of degrees of elasticity… once the case of pure competition is rejected. For praxeology cannot establish quantitative laws, only qualitative ones. (Rothbard 2009: 722)

But “Markets work better as demand gets closer to horizontal” is a qualitative law! And the impossibility point would be irrelevant even if it were true. No human being has ever crafted a perfect sphere, yet many products become more useful as they get closer to spherical. Similarly, even if no demand curves are perfectly horizontal, one can coherently claim that markets work better as demand gets closer to horizontal.

[…]

4. Some Economic History of Monopoly and Competition

[…]

Crucially, it only makes sense to say “monopolies collapsed on the free market” if it is meaningful to speak about monopoly on the free market. In these lectures on American economic history, Rothbard at least temporarily forgets his misguided a priori theory that free-market monopoly is “illusory” by definition. This in turn enables him to review the facts and conclude “Monopoly on the free market is fragile” instead of “Monopoly on the free market is a contradiction in terms” – as well as “Firms get and stay big on the free market by keeping prices low and output high” rather than “Whatever firms on the free market do is by definition ideal.”

[…]

The key question is simply: Can we trust Rothbard’s economic history? While economic analysis of the period is surprisingly sparse, the existing literature strongly confirms his overall story. The broad reviews of large samples of industries during the Gilded Age agree that so-called “monopolies” increased production and cut prices much more than the rest of the U.S. economy. (DiLorenzo 1985; DeLorme et al. 1997) Mergers-to-monopoly (a) sometimes managed to raise prices in the short run, but they reliably failed to do so in the long run; (b) quickly attracted large-scale new entry; and (c) very rarely earned supernormal profits. (Dewing 1914, 1921; Lamoreaux 1985) Unlike Rothbard, mainstream researchers acknowledge a few exceptions to these rules, but there is still a strong consensus on the rules.

A key feature in both experiments: The authorities in white coats were paper tigers. They displayed no power to punish disobedience, nor did they claim such power. When faced with reluctant subjects, they just followed this escalation script:

1. “Please continue, or Please go on.”

2. “The experiment requires that you continue.”

3. “It is absolutely essential that you continue.”

4. “You have no other choice, you must go on.”

Due to the folly of Human Subjects Review, lots of obvious variations on Milgram have never been tested. There’s one small experiment on (placebo, hence painless) self-harm, and nothing on whether people will obey commands to hand over money or other valuables. I strongly suspect that most people will not endure physical pain or financial loss on the mere say-so of the white-coated authority. But even so circumscribed, Milgram’s results give deep insight into the nature of what humans call “power.”

Intuitively, we tend to think that power flows from an ability to inflict punishment. Governments have power because they will imprison you or confiscate your property if you break the law. Employers have power because they will fire or demote you if you disobey orders. Teachers have power because they will give you a bad grade if you don’t do your work. Parents have power because they will ground you or take away your allowance if you don’t do what you’re told.

What Milgram shows, however, is that this is only part of the story. Another source of power is the perception of legitimacy, the sense that the authority is entitled to your obedience. Like when Legolas tells Boromir, “He is Aragorn, son of Arathorn. You owe him your allegiance.” In the Obedience to Authority experiment, to repeat, the white-coated scientist never ever claimed to possess the power of punishment. He just acted like he was worthy of obedience. And most of the subjects, despite misgivings, concurred.

So what? One of modernity’s most influential neologisms is “power relations.” If you listen closely, people see these power relations almost everywhere. And on reflection, many are Milgramian, distinctively lacking in punishment to back them up.

Consider, for example, those who object to age-gap relationships because “There’s a power relation.” What, pray tell, is the punishment that the older partner hangs over the head of the younger? If there’s any power relation, it exists simply because human beings tend to think that older people are entitled to boss younger people around. The same goes for workplaces that bar all relationships between people of unequal rank, even those who don’t work together. The vice president in charge of marketing has minimal ability to hurt the career of a secretary over in payroll. So if there’s any power relation, it exists simply because human beings tend to think that august vice presidents are entitled to boss around lowly secretaries.

Once you accept this point, you should also reassess how much the ability to punish matters more generally. Most parental power isn’t really based on punishment; in fact, a large share of parents are pathetic pushovers. In the face of a problem daughter, even mafioso Tony Soprano hilariously told his wife, “Let's not overplay our hand because if she finds out we're powerless, we're fucked!” Given massive grade inflation, most teachers clearly aren’t using bad grades to punish bad behavior. Most employers suffer from serious firing aversion. Even many governments are loath to actually punish lawbreakers, as we saw during Covid. In all of these cases, a large share of power comes not from punishment and threats, but the perception of legitimacy.

Not convinced? Notice that in many (though definitely not all) of these examples, the side with “less power” actually has abundant opportunities to make the side with “more power” suffer. Indeed, the balance of punishment often tips the wrong way. Problem children can torment their parents, and eventually have the option of cutting their elders off. Bad students notoriously torture teachers. Workers can and do distress employers by quitting at inopportune times. And given current discrimination laws and social norms, disgruntled workers can readily wreck their superiors’ careers. Either the whole “power relations” idea is mostly wrong, or it must be reinterpreted in Milgramian terms.

Once we do this reinterpretation, two options appear before us. One is to treat perceptions of legitimacy as fact. If people feel like scientists in white coats deserve obedience, then those scientists “have power” and non-scientists “need protection.”

But this is absurdly infantilizing and elastic. The better option is to accept that most alleged power is illusory. Though the illusion is widespread, those who perceive it have a responsibility to wake up and take charge of their lives. Act like the noble defiant minority in Milgram’s original experiment. You don’t have to do what other people tell you, even if they are wearing white coats. Instead of demanding protection from power, focus on the question, “What can he actually do to me? And would he want to, given what I can do in response?”

Better yet, ask the deeper: “Does this authority deserve my obedience?” Stop playing the victim, and start living as a thoughtful moral agent.

I just did a second immigration debate against Simon Hankinson of the Heritage Foundation. Here are my thoughts on these two interactions (plus one lunch).

1. I have said on the record that “Literally 100% of anti-immigration people I personally know are unpleasant to be around.” I now feel like I personally know Simon Hankinson, and am reconsidering that categorical statement.

I am most obliged. Perhaps my 23 years as a diplomat paid off.

2. The reason I’m reconsidering is not that I don’t know if Hankinson is unpleasant. He is not. The reason is that I’m not confident that he’s really anti-immigration! The bedrock for his stance on immigration genuinely seems to be that he thinks existing laws should be enforced regardless of their merits. In Dungeons and Dragons terms, he’s Lawful Neutral: “The rules are the rules, and we have to follow them.”

I used to play D&D in middle school. I am the same age as the Stranger Things kids. I do believe in societies that follow the rules. I have visited ~80 countries and lived a year or more in 8, so I have a good idea what it looks like in places where most people obey most laws, and in places where most people disobey most laws. That said, I don’t think perfect adherence to every law is possible or even desirable. I also think it’s fine to campaign to change laws. We certainly have done so many times in the U.S. and often for the better.

3. Normally, asserting “The rules are the rules” in an immigration argument is mere pretense. But Hankinson seems like he’d be perfectly fine with more immigration as long as we did it by the book.

This goes a little far. I think that having absorbed a wave of 5-10 million illegal and quasi-legal (parole, release with a Notice to Appear) immigrants over the Biden administration, in addition to a 3.5 million or so legal immigrants, we need to clean up the mess before we add to it.

But, in principle, I think immigration numbers should match America’s wishes, needs, and ability to absorb them. If we had (a) full employment; (b) a hypothetical pool of willing migrants who’d (i) contribute more to the fiscal balance over a lifetime than they’d take (including their dependents), and (ii) assimilate into our way of life rather than wanting to destroy and replace it; and (c) a proven lack of American workers, then we could have a higher cap on skilled migration. I’d balance this by ending family-based chain migration.

4. Hankinson’s top substantive argument against immigration is just that it is bad for native workers who directly compete against immigrants. At UVA last week, for example, he roughly asked, “If we could replace all the employees at UVA with cheaper immigrant workers, should we?” He refers to the affirmative answer as the “libertarian” view, when it’s really just the standard economists’ view (minus a little hemming and hawing). Which is, in turn, the same as the brutally honest view of any rational person! Should we have prevented the mechanization of agriculture to save jobs of farmers? Factories to save the jobs of artisans? The internet to save the jobs of travel agents? Vaccines to save the jobs of morticians? Uber to save the jobs of taxi drivers?

I always ask the question: “If we could replace all the employees at UVA with cheaper immigrant workers, should we?” because it reveals the difference between theory and reality. Numbers on paper versus real people. Audiences may think they believe no human is illegal, or that there is an international right to migrate, but they don’t actually want to take in five homeless mentally-ill drug addicts (sorry, “differently-abled persons with substance abuse disorder experiencing houselessness”), or absorb 100,000 striving migrants into their small town.

As the old joke goes, one economist says to the other, “your idea is fine in practice, but does it work in theory?” I don’t think it’s a relevant comparison to talk about factories, the internet, and Uber replacing jobs, because all those were mostly changes within a native population, not because a cohort was brought from abroad to take their jobs at lower wages and benefits. There was disruption, but it could be somewhat mitigated with new jobs and safety-net benefits.

5. The only way to make “saving jobs” rhetorically plausible is to weaponize status quo bias. All the job destruction in the past is fine. It was fine for Uber to hurt taxi drivers. But is it fine for Waymos to hurt Uber drivers? That’s a veeeery complex question that we as a sociiiiiiety need to have a looooooong conversation about.

I guess “Status quo bias” is called being a conservative. I prefer not to change things until we know, or have good odds, the change will bring improvement not decline. On the whole, I think the internet was an improvement. NAFTA and letting China into the WTO, not so much. I am unsure about AI.

6. Hankinson accuses those who accept the market’s job destruction of dogmatically assuming that the unemployed readily find better jobs. But that’s a straw man. There are always losers from progress! Always!!! The point, rather, is that progress is awesome overall for almost everyone. The secret of mass consumption is mass production, and distributional concerns are a dangerous distraction. To quote Lucas, “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.”

“There are always losers from progress! Always!!!” True. But you were talking about replacing entire U.S. workforces with cheap foreign labor for 1/5 the price and no benefits. That’s not progress, that’s unfair competition. Our level of living was not magic or instant. It took a thousand years for Europe (and the USA etc. by extension) to reach this level of internal freedom, prosperity, and security. We stand on the shoulders of our ancestors. How is it fair to our children to let people who contributed nothing to this buy into the game at the top level? You have to earn your way in and up. We can’t take them all. And we should take care of our own first.

7. Hankinson admonished students not to freak out over a few grisly deportation stories. Fair enough. But then he tried to freak them out with a few grisly stories about immigration causing job loss, crime, and so on. He even repeatedly voiced the Dadaist, “What if it was you?” when I pointed out that various fears were astronomically rare. Not kosher. The future should not be held hostage to a few stories, however true and sad.

It’s not “a few stories.” It’s many thousands. As for crime levels, they probably go down after generations, but in the short-term, people bring their culture with them. Would we expect all immigrants from violent, misogynistic, corrupt societies to instantly shed all habits on arrival? This is unreasonable. Data from across Europe show that individuals from certain countries (e.g., Afghanistan, and some in the Middle East and North Africa) offend at much higher rates than native-born (including of migrant stock). Some of that is due to variables such as age or sex (men commit much more crime than women, young men more than old). Correlation is not causation. But at some point you have to wonder…

The surge in migration is a very recent phenomenon. Here are some rough estimates of population born overseas in a few countries for comparison.

• France –>14%

• Germany –>15%

• England/Wales –> 19% ^[1]

• Poland –> 2.6% (very few from outside Europe)

• Hungary –> 7% (only 100,000 non-European)

Now, look at reported rape cases from 2000 compared to 2026.

• France ~7,500 -> 42,000 – 50,100 +450% increase

• Germany ~8,133 -> 13,100 – 39,029* +300% increase

• England/Wales ~8,500 -> 74,700 +750% increase

• Poland ~2,399 -> 1,100 – 1,127 -50% decrease

• Hungary ~412 -> 316 – 540 Stable / Minor Decline

Western Europe had terrorism from separatist groups and various political extremists before mass migration, but mass-casualty attacks by Islamists are a new phenomenon.

Let’s look at terrorist attacks since 1980:

• France - over 2,500 total incidents; ~85 by Islamists^[2]

• Germany - ~700 to 900 incidents; ~20 by Islamists since 2016

• UK - ~3,900 incidents. ~14 by Islamists

• Hungary - ~30 incidents, 0 by Islamists

• Poland - 40 to 50 incidents, 0 by Islamists

There is a noticeably less safe, less homogeneous environment in major European cities from Amsterdam to Stockholm. The quality of life has changed; it’s not just a few stories of isolated events.

8. Hankinson did make more substantive claims about immigrants’ allegedly horrible overall effects on crime, especially in Sweden. So I checked the numbers. For murder, the most clear-cut statistic, Sweden’s rate is .8/100,000, less than one-fifth the U.S. rate. And even if there was a crisis, Sweden should respond with harsher enforcement for all murderers, not impose collective punishment on high-crime subpopulations.

The sub-populations in question are not just high-crime, they are high-welfare and low-work, so they take more from the Swedish state than they pay in taxes over a lifetime. What society wants this? Host countries should select who they let in based on who will accept and adapt to their ways and who will contribute, not just who most wants to come and escape their own country’s miseries.

9. When I discussed the keyhole solution of restricting welfare to immigrants, Hankinson misinterpreted it as a facile, “Simply get rid of the welfare state.” Yes, the welfare state is popular — for natives. However, it is not popular for immigrants. The real problem is that anti-immigration people put almost all of their energy into cutting immigration rather than trying to handle reasonable complaints in a way that pro-immigration people might support. Seriously, if Trump’s central immigration policy had been “Amnesty with a lifetime welfare ban,” it plausibly could have won the support of enough Democrats to break the filibuster. Assuming, of course, that Republicans went along with it.

Welfare is a one-way ratchet. There is no conceivable political scenario where Democrats, much less DSA, accept a deal like “Amnesty with a lifetime welfare ban.” They will not cut benefits. And if they did agree, it would be with the intent of unravelling the welfare ban as soon as they could. This is exactly what happened with IRCA 1986 (they did the amnesty but never fulfilled the verification of employment authorization) and Clinton-era welfare reforms, where they signed off on cuts but quickly brought everything back via exceptions and additions.

10. Hankinson often points out that every country restricts immigration, which is of course true. “Is every country on the planet either foolish or evil?” is not a crazy argument, though if you believe in American exceptionalism (as I think Hankinson does) you should feel some cognitive dissonance. What’s bizarre, though, is that Hankinson also specifically points out that the worst countries in the world restrict immigration. That’s plainly an argument (if not a strong one) for doing the opposite.

I do believe that culture matters. Why is Israel developed and wealthy and Yemen poor? Is it the soil, air, and water? Are states poor, backward, corrupt, and badly-ruled because of “structural racism,” “colonial oppression,” or some other intangible alien force, or does it have anything to do with the ability, actions, and character of the people in those states?

11. Hankinson warns that “Immigrants will save Social Security” is a “Big Lie.” Given current Social Security policies and the level of immigration, that is indeed an exaggeration. But immigrants do help. And yes, immigration could easily solve the entire problem if you accepted far more while denying them benefits.

Every credible study I’ve seen shows that age, skills, language, etc. are the determinants of whether immigrants contribute more than they cost. Young, educated, skilled migrants (if not encumbered by many dependents) are a net plus. But that’s not who Western countries are getting. Biden paroled, released, and otherwise let in a lot more unskilled, uneducated, monoglot migrants than Anglophone 25-year-olds with STEM degrees. And, as before, we all know there is no prospect of denying benefits to immigrants. CA, MA, IL, and others recently added indigent illegal immigrants to their welfare and Medicaid rolls.

12. The silliest thing Hankinson said is that immigration supporters think that “No country is better than any other.” Of course some countries are better than others. And those countries ought to have a lot more people in them.

One of the reasons some countries are better than others is because they have fewer people in them, or the right people. Would the USA be better with a billion people in it? Might it matter where those people were from? Economists treat people like widget-making robots and don’t take culture into account. But it is everything. Pakistan and India have ethnically identical populations around their border, but their results in education, economic growth, and political freedom are very different. Haiti and the Dominican Republic share an island and similar populations, yet the latter is much better off. East and West Germany were literally the same people on both sides of the border, yet they developed very differently based on political culture. Same with North and South Korea. Are any Muslim-majority countries safe, rich, and democratic?

^[1] https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06077/

^[2] Defined as Islamic extremists, Jihadists, etc. who want to achieve political/social change through violence.

After my initial conversation on sentiment analysis with ChatGPT, I decided to ask it to add Richard Hanania to the Cowen/Hanson/Caplan/Krugman comparisons. Here’s what happened.

ChatGPT: Adding Richard Hanania makes the exercise much more interesting, because he combines some traits of Caplan and Krugman while being unusually high in contempt/ridicule. Looking at his recent writing, especially 2025–26, I’d revise the comparison this way. These remain human-coded 0–10 estimates of prose, not psychological assessments or corpus-derived measurements.

The distinctive Hanania emotion is contempt

This jumps out of his writing. Hanania doesn’t merely say that ideas are incorrect or developments unfortunate. He very frequently evaluates people’s intelligence.

Recent examples include “stupid people on the right,” politics making smart people dumber, Musk being “about as stupid as human beings get when it comes to politics,” and an entire essay called “On Defeating the Stupid/Interested Quadrant.” Richard Hanania

Another recent essay begins:

“I spend a lot of time writing about how the discourse is getting dumber.”

He proceeds to contrast old conspiracy theories with increasingly bizarre contemporary ones. Richard Hanania

And his new book is Kakistocracy: Why Populism Ends in Disaster. A July essay explaining its empirical case is literally subtitled “How we know it’s bad.” Richard Hanania

This makes contempt/ridicule worth separating from anger. Krugman is more characteristically indignant: somebody is doing something cruel, corrupt, dishonest, or dangerous. Hanania’s characteristic reaction is more often:

How can these people possibly be this stupid?

But Hanania is much happier-sounding than Krugman

This is where generic sentiment analysis would again go astray.

Hanania’s writing gives plenty of evidence that he enjoys things. He gets excited about books and ideas; describes Works in Progress as essentially “the most must-read thing on the internet”; and his older conversational writing repeatedly uses cool, beautiful, etc. Richard Hanania

His economics/progress writing is also fundamentally optimistic. In a recent essay on automation, he emphasizes the extraordinary increase in living standards since 1790—antibiotics, cars, indoor plumbing, air conditioning and “an endless number of modern conveniences.” His argument is precisely that destroying jobs through technological improvement is the basis of progress. Richard Hanania

So I’d put Hanania considerably closer to Caplan than Krugman on baseline enjoyment of modern life.

Yet his political sentiment has become extremely negative

This matters because there appears to be a time trend.

In 2022, talking with Cowen, Hanania was explicitly skeptical about excessive political pessimism. He observed that political violence had been substantially worse historically and suggested that modern media produce so much negativity that Americans might remain pessimistic “no matter how good things get.” Richard Hanania

Compare September 2026:

“My view of the conservative side of the political spectrum has grown increasingly dark.”

He describes its dominant impulses as “rotten to the core” and worries about its “slide into stupidity and genocidal vibes.” Richard Hanania

Or his 2025 discussion of America’s future, which considers alternating left-wing cancel culture and right-wing authoritarianism, while also explicitly presenting an optimistic post-Trump/post-woke scenario. Richard Hanania

That’s important. Hanania isn’t simply a dispositional pessimist. He thinks current American politics has gotten worse.

Indeed, today’s essay is revealingly optimistic about the possibility of reversal. His “Trump Theory of Everything” argues that one individual’s departure could eliminate a surprisingly large fraction of America’s current political dysfunction. Richard Hanania

So I’d score his current-conditions pessimism higher than his long-run pessimism.

Hanania versus Caplan

This may be the most revealing comparison.

They share a lot: strong belief in material progress, enjoyment of intellectual life, willingness to say extremely negative things, impatience with conventional wisdom, and unusually direct prose.

But their negative emotions differ.

Caplan: This belief/policy is crazy, evil or terrible.

Hanania: The people responsible for this are unbelievably stupid.

Caplan’s writing also contains vastly more affection. Friends, family, students, colleagues, parties, children, travel, intellectual heroes, strangers he meets—all regularly generate explicit positive emotion. I see much less of that in Hanania’s writing.

Thus I’d distinguish joy from warmth. Hanania seems fairly high on the former and substantially lower on the latter.

Hanania versus Cowen

Almost opposites in presentation.

Cowen sees something disturbing and says:

Department of Yikes. Have a nice day.

Hanania sees it and writes 3,000 words explaining why everyone involved is an idiot.

Yet their underlying world assessments may be closer than their tones suggest. Both combine strong appreciation of civilization, innovation and interesting intellectual work with considerable concern about contemporary politics and institutions.

Hanania versus Hanson

This is perhaps the largest stylistic contrast.

Hanson can contemplate human extinction while sounding like he’s deriving a comparative-static result.

Hanania can encounter a bad political argument and sound personally offended that someone was stupid enough to make it.

Hence Hanson’s negative subject matter / negative emotional expression ratio is enormous. Hanania’s is almost the reverse.

Hanania versus Krugman

They’re superficially similar because both use lots of harsh language. But I’d distinguish their characteristic negative affect:

Krugman → moral indignation + alarm.

Hanania → contempt + amusement + anger.

And Hanania seems much less anxious. His recent fiscal essay is a good example: he predicts severe constraints from Social Security, Medicare and debt, but presents the problem analytically, comparing new spending proposals to a bankrupt person deciding to remodel his house. Richard Hanania

That is negative without being frightened.

So my compressed portraits of all five would now be:

Caplan: Life is wonderful; people nevertheless believe lots of crazy and terrible things.

Cowen: The world is fascinating and full of excellent things. Also, there are a surprisingly large number of reasons to worry. Have a nice day.

Hanson: The long-run dynamics may be quite bad. Let’s construct a model.

Hanania: Modern civilization is great. Why are the people running politics so unbelievably stupid?

Krugman: Important things are going badly because people are doing terrible things, and this should make you angry and alarmed.

That makes Hanania arguably the highest-contest writer of the five, Caplan the highest-positive-affect/highest-warmth writer, Hanson the least emotionally expressive, Cowen the most ironically alarmist, and Krugman the highest in overt anger and alarm. Those distinctions strike me as much more informative than a single positive/negative sentiment score.

Caplan: What does your analysis show about sentiment analysis? What are the broader lessons of analyzing these five thinkers?

ChatGPT: The exercise has made me substantially more skeptical of ordinary sentiment analysis. These five writers form an unusually good stress test because they demonstrate several different ways the same underlying attitude can produce radically different linguistic sentiment scores—and vice versa.

The biggest lesson is that sentiment of language is not sentiment of belief.

1. Lexical sentiment measures style at least as much as outlook

Consider the central puzzle we uncovered:

Cowen: highly positive vocabulary, substantial substantive worry.
Caplan: lots of harsh vocabulary, unusually optimistic worldview.
Hanson: disturbing propositions, emotionally neutral vocabulary.
Hanania: contempt expressed partly through humor and intellectual language.
Krugman: negative propositions expressed with negative vocabulary.

Krugman is therefore the easy case. His semantics and rhetoric point in the same direction. When he thinks something is terrible, he tends to use words like terrible, stupid, dangerous, and cruel. A conventional sentiment model works relatively well.

The other four expose different failure modes.

2. Cowen demonstrates the irony/understatement problem

“Have a nice day” is almost a perfect adversarial example.

Lexically:

HAVE + NICE + DAY → positive

Pragmatically:

Here is a horrifying development. → negative

“Department of Yikes” is easier for a modern model, but the underlying Cowen technique remains: describe something alarming in an emotionally restrained voice and allow the reader to infer the evaluation.

This means a writer can become more pessimistic without becoming lexically more negative. Cowen could double the number of posts about nuclear war, fiscal collapse, AI catastrophe and institutional decay while maintaining exactly the same polite, curious prose.

A conventional sentiment index might barely notice.

3. Caplan demonstrates the mention-versus-use problem

Suppose someone writes:

“People are absurdly pessimistic. Life is vastly better than it used to be.”

That is an extremely optimistic proposition containing absurdly and pessimistic.

Or:

“This terrible argument ignores the enormous improvements in human welfare.”

Again, negative vocabulary embedded in a positive worldview.

Caplan’s writing contains a lot of this because he frequently argues against pessimism, fear and claims of social harm. A bag-of-words model partially counts the views he’s attacking as his own sentiment.

There’s an additional Caplan effect: emotional amplitude. He readily says both “I love X” and “Y is evil.” Cowen avoids both extremes. Averaging the words can therefore make two radically different personalities of prose look similar.

4. Hanson demonstrates the topic-versus-attitude problem

This may be the cleanest methodological lesson.

Imagine:

“There is a substantial probability that civilization eventually collapses.”

versus

“I’m terrified that civilization is going to collapse!”

The propositions could encode exactly the same probability distribution. Their affect is radically different.

Hanson specializes in the first construction. That’s why the low variance in our little quantitative experiment was interesting. He can move from mating to hidden motives to cultural maladaptation to extinction without changing linguistic register much.

Consequently, an affect classifier tells you something real about Hanson—his prose is affectively restrained—but tells you remarkably little about whether Hanson expects good or bad outcomes.

5. Hanania demonstrates the contempt/humor problem

Positive/negative sentiment is an especially poor representation of ridicule.

Calling an argument “impressively stupid” contains impressively. Calling a political development “hilarious” may express enjoyment of something the author considers disastrous. Describing one’s “fascination” with someone’s dishonesty generates positive lexical markers while communicating contempt.

This suggests that contempt is its own dimension. So are amusement and sarcasm.

A model with only:

positive ←——→ negative

is throwing away exactly the information that makes Hanania’s prose distinctive.

6. Krugman demonstrates when sentiment analysis actually works

This is an important counterpoint. I wouldn’t conclude that sentiment analysis is useless.

Krugman’s rhetorical style makes affect comparatively easy to measure because word valence, authorial evaluation, and emotional intensity are correlated. Our small quantitative sample picked him out immediately.

If we had a million anonymous passages and wanted to distinguish strongly negative polemical writing from neutral prose, ordinary sentiment analysis would probably perform quite well.

The trouble begins when we interpret that score as:

optimism, happiness, pessimism, worldview, fearfulness, or belief about the future.

Those are different latent variables.

7. “Positive sentiment” itself decomposes

Our five-person comparison suggests at least this structure:

And “emotion” itself needs several dimensions:

Positive: joy, enthusiasm, affection, admiration, amusement.

Negative: anger, fear/anxiety, sadness, contempt, disgust.

Then independently:

World assessment: things are going well/badly.

Future expectation: improvement/deterioration.

Agency/blame: bad outcomes caused by identifiable people versus impersonal forces.

These dimensions needn’t correlate strongly.

Our five writers almost look selected to occupy different cells.

8. This creates a serious problem for large-scale social-science applications

Suppose researchers calculate newspaper sentiment from 1950–2025 and discover that news became 30% “more negative.”

What happened?

Maybe the world got worse.

Maybe journalism became more alarmist.

Maybe journalists became angrier.

Maybe subject matter shifted.

Maybe headlines became more clickbaity.

Maybe prose became less euphemistic.

Maybe sarcasm increased.

Maybe people began explicitly discussing risks that previously went unmentioned.

Maybe the underlying classifier responds differently to changing vocabulary.

Our five writers show that these aren’t minor theoretical qualifications. They can reverse the substantive interpretation of the measurement.

Cowen and Caplan are particularly devastating examples. A lexical model can plausibly tell you that Cowen is more positive while a propositional classifier could plausibly tell you that Caplan believes the world is better.

Both measurements could be correct.

9. Modern LLMs potentially permit a much better approach

Instead of asking:

“Is this passage positive or negative?”

I’d ask several independent questions:

Affect: What emotions does the author express?

Propositional valence: Does the author claim that the situation being discussed is good or bad?

Expectations: Does the author expect improvement or deterioration?

Target: Toward whom or what is the sentiment directed?

Intensity: How strong is it?

Epistemic status: Is the author asserting the proposition, quoting it, considering it, or rejecting it?

Rhetorical mode: Is the statement sincere, sarcastic, humorous, or understated?

That would solve much of the Cowen/Caplan/Hanson problem.

And crucially, these should be coded sentence by sentence before aggregation. Otherwise a 2,000-word essay saying “Here are ten pessimistic arguments and why all ten are wrong” can easily get classified as pessimistic.

10. There’s an even broader lesson about quantitative social science

This exercise is a miniature example of construct validity.

Once we can assign something a number, it’s extraordinarily tempting to forget what the number actually measures.

TextBlob gives us a wonderfully precise result like:

polarity = +0.137

But that precision doesn’t solve the hard problem. The hard problem occurred before measurement:

What exactly do we mean by “sentiment”?

If we mean valence of vocabulary, +.137 is potentially meaningful.

If we mean how happy Cowen is, it tells us almost nothing.

If we mean how optimistic Cowen is about civilization, it may actually be misleading.

That distinction—measurement precision versus conceptual validity—is probably the biggest general lesson from the whole exercise.

And these five happen to make an unusually good teaching example. You could almost build a methods lecture around them:

Cowen: sarcasm/understatement failure.
Caplan: mention/use + high-amplitude failure.
Hanson: topic/affect failure.
Hanania: contempt/humor failure.
Krugman: the comparatively easy benchmark case.

The amusing bottom line is that our primitive sentiment algorithm wasn’t necessarily wrong about any of them. We were initially asking it a question its output couldn’t answer.

Caplan:

Do a sentiment analysis of Cowen, Hanson, Caplan, and Krugman.

ChatGPT:

If by sentiment analysis you mean something like “How positive versus negative is the characteristic emotional tone of their public writing?”, I’d separate valence (positive/negative) from warmth and intensity. A simple automated sentiment score would otherwise badly misread intellectual criticism as unhappiness.

My qualitative coding of a large representative sample of their blogging would probably look roughly like this:

These aren’t psychological assessments; they’re my estimates of observable prose, and I haven’t computationally scored their complete corpora. There are enormous corpora available for three of them: Cowen has posted daily since 2003, Caplan’s archive contains 5,000+ posts since 2005, and Hanson’s Overcoming Bias archive has thousands of posts.

Cowen is probably the most positively valenced writer. A remarkable amount of Marginal Revolution consists of finding something interesting and directing readers toward it. His characteristic vocabulary is approving but understated: excellent, interesting, important, recommended, underrated. Even when discussing something bad, his instinct is often “What can we learn from this?” rather than indignation. His intellectual persona is extraordinarily low in anger. This fits the breadth of his output—books, restaurants, art, travel, talented people, new research—and his continuing habit of promoting other scholars’ work.

Caplan is probably the happiest-sounding of the four, although not necessarily the least negative. That’s an interesting distinction. His writing contains lots of enthusiasm, gratitude, affection, praise of friends, enjoyment of family and intellectual life, and explicit celebration of things he likes. His farewell to EconLog, for example, is effusively grateful, and his autobiographical writing readily talks about things he loves and enjoys. Econlib But Caplan also uses much stronger condemnatory vocabulary than Cowen: evil, irrational, terrible, awful, crazy, unfair, etc. The result is unusually high variance sentiment: lots of +2 and +3 statements alongside plenty of −2 and −3 statements. Cowen seems more continuously mildly positive.

Hanson is the hardest for ordinary sentiment analysis. His prose is strikingly affectless. Overcoming Bias explicitly presents itself as an inquiry into why people believe and behave as they do and the hidden motives behind those behaviors. Overcoming Bias He routinely advances propositions with negative semantic content—people deceive themselves, status competition drives behavior, professed motives aren’t real motives, the future may be strange or dangerous—without sounding angry or distressed. Even when discussing people calling him offensive and demanding that he be fired, his response is essentially to construct a model explaining the phenomenon. Overcoming Bias So a lexical sentiment program might classify Hanson as fairly negative, while a human coder of emotional affect would probably classify him as extremely neutral.

Krugman is the clear outlier in negative sentiment, particularly in his political writing. His characteristic political vocabulary includes words such as terrible, alarming, stupid, lies, and deranged. That’s not an inference from his ideology: recent columns literally include “Who’s Deranged, Exactly?”, describe remarks as “stupid,” describe economic numbers as “terrible,” and characterize economic developments as “alarming.” paulkrugman.substack.com His nonpolitical economics writing would presumably score much closer to neutral, so corpus selection matters enormously.

There’s also an interesting positive-affect/negative-affect distinction. They aren’t necessarily opposite ends of one dimension. My tentative characterization would be:

Cowen: high positive, low negative.
Caplan: very high positive, medium negative.
Hanson: low positive, low negative.
Krugman: medium positive, very high negative.

That makes Caplan versus Cowen the most interesting comparison. A conventional sentiment algorithm might easily declare Cowen “more positive,” because Caplan uses much harsher words. But if the question is “Who sounds like he enjoys being alive the most?”, I suspect a human-coded corpus analysis would give a different answer.

If you want, I can do a real quantitative version: randomly sample, say, 200 posts each from MR, Overcoming Bias, Bet On It/EconLog, and Krugman’s archives, strip quotations, and score positive affect, negative affect, anger, anxiety, enthusiasm, and affection separately. That would be much more informative than generic positive/negative sentiment.

Caplan: Do it.

ChatGPT: Yes. I did a first quantitative pass, and it changes my earlier impression in one important respect.

I used recent public writing from all four authors, concentrating on author-written prose rather than quotations, and coded language along six dimensions: positive affect, negative affect, anger/hostility, anxiety/fear, enthusiasm, and interpersonal warmth. This is a hand-coded/lexical analysis of the retrievable corpus rather than a black-box “positive/negative” classifier; that’s important because, for example, Hanson can write extensively about fear without himself expressing fear. The current archives also confirm that corpus composition differs substantially: Cowen has many link posts, whereas Caplan, Hanson, and especially Krugman more often publish essays. Marginal REVOLUTION

On a normalized 0–100 scale, where 50 is roughly neutral:

These should be read as descriptive estimates of writing style, not measurements of personality or mental state. And I wouldn’t attach significance to, say, a three-point difference. The large differences are what matter.

The striking result: Caplan and Cowen are positive in different ways

My initial intuition holds up, but I’d now state it more precisely.

Cowen has the lowest negativity. His characteristic linguistic move is recommendation: “excellent,” “recommended,” “interesting,” “important,” “worth reading.” Even posts concerning unpleasant subjects tend to remain emotionally flat. A recent link post, for example, jumps from cyber risk and genocide to AI regulation and UAPs without Cowen supplying much affective commentary of his own. Marginal REVOLUTION

Caplan has the highest positive affect, enthusiasm, and warmth—but considerably more negative affect than Cowen. His recent feed illustrates the combination nicely. He writes affectionately about Brian Doherty—“a true friend”—and cheerfully invites readers to meet him for meals and games, while elsewhere writing strongly condemnatory essays about war, socialism, regulation, etc. Bet On It

So I would distinguish:

Cowen = most consistently pleasant.
Caplan = most exuberantly positive.

That distinction survives coding much better than generic “sentiment.”

Hanson is genuinely unusual

Hanson comes out almost exactly as I suspected: low affect rather than simply negative affect.

Consider his recent “Modern Worries.” The semantic content is extraordinarily negative: fear, bad outcomes, things going wrong, worries about civilization and AI. But Hanson is analyzing the production of worry. The prose itself is calm and abstract. Overcoming Bias

The same phenomenon appears when he writes about AI takeover: escaped AIs might “enslave or end the rest of us,” yet he immediately turns this into an institutional comparison among liability, retaliation, and regulation. Overcoming Bias

This produces a large distinction between:

subject-matter negativity ≠ expressed negative emotion.

A naïve sentiment classifier would substantially overstate Hanson’s negativity.

Krugman is the enormous outlier

This result isn’t close. Krugman’s current corpus contains vastly more hostile and alarmed language than the other three.

Even his recent titles/subtitles provide an unusually concentrated sample: The Long Decline of America, The Hits Keep Coming: How much chaos can the economy take?, The Plot to Steal Venezuela’s Oil: A scam that is both vile and deeply stupid, and The MAGA Plot(s) to Destroy Humanity. Paul Krugman Substack

The body text amplifies the difference. A recent Canada piece uses terms such as “idiotic,” “stupid,” “nonsense,” “deranged,” “failures,” and “bullying” in a short stretch. Paul Krugman Substack Another calls current officials “chaos monkeys,” followed by “performed very poorly,” “loss of trust,” “degradation,” “mass deportations,” and other negative constructions. Paul Krugman Substack

Importantly, this isn’t simply because Krugman writes about politics. Caplan also writes extensively about subjects he strongly dislikes—war, socialism, immigration restrictions, regulation—and Hanson writes about potential civilizational catastrophes. The difference is in the language used to evaluate them.

One result I would revise from my previous answer

I previously characterized Hanson as perhaps the least emotionally intense. After looking more systematically, I think Cowen deserves that distinction in ordinary prose, although for a different reason.

Hanson discusses more emotionally loaded subjects and occasionally makes stark claims. Cowen’s authorial voice is remarkably restrained even when the underlying material is alarming. For example, he can present a paper finding a large negative effect of democratization on asset values almost entirely by quoting the abstract and adding a short bibliographic comment. Marginal REVOLUTION

So my revised two-dimensional picture is roughly:

                    HIGH POSITIVE AFFECT
                           |
                      CAPLAN
                           |
                    COWEN  |
                           |
LOW NEGATIVE --------------+-------------- HIGH NEGATIVE
                           |
                 HANSON    |
                           |
                                      KRUGMAN
                           |
                    LOW POSITIVE AFFECT

The most interesting statistic to me is positive-minus-negative affect. On the coding above, it is approximately Cowen +40, Caplan +32, Hanson +3, Krugman −34.

But that statistic conceals something important: Caplan has by far the largest emotional range. Cowen’s distribution is compressed around mildly positive/neutral; Caplan frequently moves from strong praise to strong condemnation. Thus Cowen wins a conventional net-sentiment measure, while Caplan wins measures closer to joy, enthusiasm, affection, and excitement.

So my original throwaway question—“Who sounds like he enjoys being alive the most?”—actually points toward a real methodological issue. Sentiment analysis isn’t a happiness detector. On the textual evidence, Caplan’s prose contains the strongest behavioral markers of enjoyment and enthusiasm; Cowen’s contains the least negativity; Hanson is the most affectively detached; and Krugman’s recent writing contains by far the most anger and alarm. Bet On It

The next step I’d trust considerably more would be to take exactly 200 randomly selected substantive posts per author from the same years, exclude link posts, interviews and quotations, and run the identical dictionary/model on every sentence. That would let us put confidence intervals around these differences rather than treating my 0–100 scores as precise measurements.

Caplan: How can you say Cowen isn't negative? What about the recurring Department of Yikes, sarcastic "have a nice day," and "we should be worried" claims?

ChatGPT: Yes. That is a serious problem with my characterization of Cowen, and it makes me think a conventional sentiment analysis would be especially misleading for him.

Cowen has a recurring rhetorical style in which the surface language is neutral or even positive, but the pragmatic meaning is strongly negative. Your three examples capture it well.

“Department of Yikes” is literally a recurring category of alarm. One early example concerns European protectionism, which Cowen introduces as a “frightening inversion of satire into reality.” Another “Department of Yikes” post concerns proposals to postpone Greek elections, which he plainly regards as dangerous. Marginal REVOLUTION

“Have a nice day” is even more important because a lexical sentiment analyzer will get its sign backwards. Cowen uses it as deadpan punctuation after describing something disturbing. In one case he discusses the possibility of Greece experiencing simultaneous hyperinflation and hyperdeflation and closes, “have a nice day.” Marginal REVOLUTION In another, a report about a potentially dangerous ancient virus ends simply, “Have a nice day.” Marginal REVOLUTION And he’s still consciously using the trope: in March 2026, after a passage about “epistemic chaos,” he wrote, “Can I say again ‘Have a nice day’?” Marginal REVOLUTION

Then there is the worry vocabulary. Cowen regularly frames posts around whether “we should be worried,” “should X be worried?”, risks, tail risks, decline, institutional deterioration, and so forth. For example, on climate uncertainty he explicitly argues that greater model uncertainty can mean more reason to worry about tail risk, not less. Marginal REVOLUTION

So I think I made a conceptual mistake. I implicitly measured something like:

negative emotional vocabulary

when what we actually want is closer to:

negative assessment of the state of the world

Those are very different for Cowen.

In fact, I’d now hypothesize a quite different pattern:

This also explains why Cowen can feel considerably darker than my earlier description despite rarely sounding angry. He has a deadpan-pessimist rhetorical style: present some alarming fact, refrain from emoting about it, perhaps add a laconic sentence, and let the reader supply the alarm.

Caplan is almost the reverse. He is perfectly willing to call something awful, evil, insane, etc., so a sentiment program records lots of negativity. But his background model of the world is unusually cheerful: life is good, progress is enormous, friends and family are wonderful, most risks are exaggerated, people should worry less, and the future is probably going to be better. So his negative vocabulary may coexist with much more positive world sentiment.

That suggests a much better experiment than the one I proposed. Don’t run generic sentiment analysis at all. Have a model blind-code random passages for several conceptually separate variables: expressed anger, expressed anxiety, assessment of current conditions, expectations about the future, interpersonal warmth, enthusiasm/joy, and sarcasm/irony. In particular, “Have a nice day” after a catastrophe should score negative, not positive.

My prior after noticing your examples changes substantially: I no longer expect Cowen to have especially low substantive negativity. I wouldn’t be surprised if a properly coded sample found Cowen much closer to Hanson or even Krugman on frequency of “things are going badly/we should worry” judgments, while remaining radically different from Krugman in anger and emotional presentation. That distinction is probably the interesting result.

Caplan: Redo everything as well as you can.

ChatGPT: Yes. After your Cowen objection, I think the original one-dimensional exercise was conceptually wrong. I went back through recent material for all four, while also looking for the recurring rhetorical devices that a lexical sentiment program would systematically miss.

The key is to distinguish emotional expression from substantive evaluation of the world. Cowen is the clearest demonstration of why.

Revised assessment

These are my best human-coded estimates of characteristic public prose, on a 0–10 scale. They are not machine-generated corpus statistics, so treat differences of ~1 point as noise.

The biggest correction is Cowen. I had confused low expressed negative emotion with low negativity. He has plenty of negativity; he simply delivers much of it deadpan.

Cowen: cheerful tastes, worried worldview, extraordinarily calm delivery

Your examples are exactly the evidence I had underweighted.

“Department of Yikes” isn’t an incidental phrase. It is a recurring MR device for saying, in effect, look at this alarming development. One early instance explicitly calls the development a “frightening inversion of satire into reality”; another applies the label to proposals to suspend Greek elections. Marginal REVOLUTION

“Have a nice day” performs much the same function sarcastically. A naïve sentiment classifier sees nice and day and scores it positive. A competent reader understands something close to:

Here is another disturbing fact. Draw the obvious conclusion.

Similarly, Cowen often expresses worry without sounding worried. Even his June 2026 book roundup goes from “very good,” “excellent,” and “I liked” to a demographic book summarized with the terse judgment “worry is in order.” Marginal REVOLUTION

That’s quintessential Cowen.

And this coexists with enormous positive evaluation. His book posts are absolutely saturated with excellent, best, good, fun, delightful, beautifully written, first-rate, stunningly good, amazing, recommended. Marginal REVOLUTION

So Cowen isn’t well described as either “positive” or “negative.” A much better description is:

High appreciation + high concern + very low emotional agitation.

He seems to think there is an astonishing amount of wonderful stuff in the world and an astonishing number of things worth worrying about.

That combination is unusual.

Hanson: darker than Cowen, but even less emotional

My earlier characterization of Hanson as neutral also needs revision.

His affect is neutral. His substantive worldview increasingly isn’t.

Recent Hanson is remarkably explicit. In July:

“I do now see our world as going bad”

because of cultural change. Overcoming Bias

He describes the dominant world culture as “drifting into maladaption.” Overcoming Bias And his current best guess about the Great Filter is that a substantial portion remains ahead of humanity, with a stable world government as his leading candidate. Overcoming Bias

His September essay “Modern Worries” makes an even more revealing observation: over a sufficiently broad horizon, “you have far more fears than hopes.” Overcoming Bias

Yet Hanson almost never sounds frightened.

Even when discussing AIs taking over the world and potentially enslaving or exterminating humanity, he immediately converts the problem into institutional analysis: liability, retaliation, regulation, incentives. Overcoming Bias

So Hanson is almost the purest case of:

Pessimistic propositions without pessimistic affect.

And there’s an important complication: he is often anti-alarmist about the particular danger everyone else fears. His AI writings repeatedly argue that people exaggerate AI-specific dangers relative to ordinary cultural evolution. Overcoming Bias

Hence I would now describe him as detached long-run pessimism, not neutrality.

Caplan: much more negative language than Cowen, much more positive worldview

Caplan is almost Cowen’s mirror image.

He readily uses words such as crazy, absurd, evil, terrible, and irrational. A current immigration debate opening literally calls the opposing resolution a “crazy view.” Bet On It Protectionism is “absurd,” and recent protectionism has taken “a major turn for the worse.” Bet On It

So lexical sentiment analysis would find substantial negativity.

But zoom out and the baseline worldview is extraordinarily positive.

Caplan explicitly identifies himself as an optimist and argues that Americans are materially “far better off” than during the Cold War, while complaining that the public is chronically miserable despite its circumstances. Bet On It

More strikingly, positive affect repeatedly appears when no argument requires it. Low-skilled workers aren’t merely economically productive:

“I love low-skilled workers.”

He proceeds to say that they improve life for his family, friends, students, country, and world. Bet On It

His acknowledgments describe economics as “supremely good to me,” his career as a “dream job for life,” and economics as a “glorious, eye-opening subject.” Bet On It

Social writing is even more revealing. Capla-Con invites everyone’s “family and friends, and all their family and friends (unto infinity),” promises games, conversation, karaoke and food, welcomes children, and jokes that some attendees find true love. Bet On It His recent travel/event posts repeatedly invite strangers to dinner, games and meetups. Bet On It

Even Covid gets retrospectively described partly in terms of the friendship it produced with Dwarkesh Patel. Bet On It

So Caplan’s unusual combination is:

Very positive baseline worldview + very strong positive emotion + willingness to express strong negative judgments.

That is why generic sentiment could easily underestimate his optimism.

Krugman: substantive negativity and expressive negativity

Krugman is the least ambiguous case.

He doesn’t merely discuss bad developments. He repeatedly tells the reader that they are awful, attributes blame, and expresses anger about them.

Recent examples are unusually concentrated. “Adding Injury to Insult, Canada Edition” begins by calling the trade war “idiotic,” then “stupid,” “gratuitous,” and the product of “deranged Trump syndrome,” before discussing “failures” and “bullying.” Paul Krugman Substack

“The Plot to Steal Venezuela’s Oil” has the subtitle “A scam that is both vile and deeply stupid” and begins with America’s “ugly reputation” and history of supporting dictators and overthrowing governments. Paul Krugman Substack

“The Hits Keep Coming” describes “chaos monkeys,” war, loss of trust, degradation of government capacity and mass deportations before announcing, “Here’s the bad news: The shocks just keep coming.” Paul Krugman Substack

Even a genuinely positive development—falling crime—is framed through conflict: “The Good News Trump Won’t Mention,” followed immediately by Trump’s boasting, “whining,” “rants,” and “completely, verifiably false” claims. Paul Krugman Substack

So Krugman’s negativity operates simultaneously at three levels:

The world: important things are going badly.
Other people: identifiable actors are responsible.
Emotion: those developments deserve indignation.

That third element sharply separates him from Cowen and Hanson.

The comparison I now find most illuminating

Forget “positive versus negative.” Put them on two axes:

That still simplifies matters, because Cowen and Hanson differ.

Cowen: The world contains wonderful things. Enjoy them. Also, here are 17 things you should be worried about. Have a nice day.

Hanson: Long-run cultural/institutional dynamics may be going very badly. Here is a model explaining why.

Caplan: Life is fantastic and progress is amazing. Unfortunately, people believe and do a remarkable number of terrible things.

Krugman: Important things are going badly, particular people are causing them, and you should be alarmed and angry about it.

So what happened to my original conclusions?

I’d revise them substantially:

Most overt joy/enthusiasm: Caplan, by a large margin.

Most appreciation/praise: probably Caplan and Cowen, but expressed differently. Cowen may praise things, books, food, ideas and talent at an extraordinary rate; Caplan expresses much more affection toward people and life.

Most anger: Krugman by a large margin.

Least anger: Hanson, with Cowen close.

Most explicit anxiety/alarm: Krugman.

Most frequent low-key signals that something is worrying: Cowen is probably much higher than I originally thought.

Darkest long-run model: Hanson is a serious contender. His recent writings about maladaptive cultural change and the Great Filter are genuinely bleak, despite his placid presentation. Overcoming Bias

Most optimistic underlying worldview: Caplan.

And the most interesting contrast is now Caplan–Cowen, not Caplan–Krugman. Both consume the world enthusiastically. But Caplan’s default response to alleged dangers is unusually often “people worry too much”, whereas Cowen’s is unusually often “this deserves more attention/worry than it is getting.”

So your “Department of Yikes / have a nice day / we should be worried” observation doesn’t merely move Cowen a couple of points. It reveals that my original metric was measuring the wrong thing. Cowen is emotionally serene but substantively quite worry-prone. That is precisely the kind of writer whom conventional sentiment analysis systematically misclassifies.

Selfish Reasons to Have More Kids is the only book I ever wrote that definitely improved the world a lot. A lower-bound estimate is that several hundred extra babies were born as a result — a social value of over a billion dollars. Now a new edition of the book, shipping November 17, is available for pre-order.

While the main text is unchanged, it features a new Afterword where I evaluate subsequent research and reflect on my first-hand experience as a parent. Including:

a. International adoption research.

At the time, I was unaware of any systematic research on the effects of international adoption on child development. Only in 2017 did I discover a stack of studies on this very issue. The results closely fit common sense: Growing up in the Third World gravely damages both body and mind, for life. International adoptees do much better on physical measures, especially height, weight, and head circumference. And they do much better on mental measures, especially IQ and school performance. The younger adoptees arrive in the First World, the better they do—and contrary to the rule that cognitive gains fade out, the mental benefits of early international adoption remain blatant in adulthood.

The punchline:

Selfish Reasons is a parenting book, but I’ve written a whole other work, Open Borders, on immigration policy. The evidence on international adoption ties both books together. “Choosing the right parents” is greatly overrated intranationally but not internationally. If you’d been raised by a random different family in the First World, you probably would have turned out about the same. But if you’d grown up in the Third World, you probably would have been stunted, both physically and mentally. If the sheer unfairness of life troubles you, stop worrying about metaphorical barriers to success inside rich countries and focus instead on literal barriers to success between rich countries and poor countries.

b. GWAS (Genome-Wide Association Studies)

Since Alexander has already done a better job here than I could do after many months of reading, I’ll only add one extra point. Twin and adoption studies ask questions that matter to not only every parent but every curious person. Why do people turn out the way they do? How different would I be if I’d grown up in a different family? What explains intergenerational success?

GWAS, in contrast, ask questions that almost no one has ever really cared about. Which specific genes lead to intelligence, height, educational success, or whatever? What difference does it make? In the long run, granted, GWAS could become extremely useful for genetic engineering. A few IVF providers are starting to calculate polygenic scores to decide which embryos to implant—and unlike misanthropic “bioethicists,” I wish them all the luck in the world. Still, for the typical person who plans to have children the typical way, twin and adoption research provides vital guidance, and GWAS are all but useless.

c. Hilger and Homeschooling

After criticizing behavioral genetics and inventorying research purporting to show large effects of parenting, Nate Hilger, writing in The Atlantic, accuses me of deep hypocrisy: “Perhaps most telling, I’ve had trouble identifying any critics of intensive parenting who do anything else with their own children. One economist argues that parents have little power to shape their children’s future and yet homeschools both of his children.”…

I take no offense at Hilger’s accusation of hypocrisy. “If parenting makes little difference, why on Earth would you bother homeschooling?” is a fine and fair question. But if he had googled, he would have discovered that I wrote an essay answering this accusation just weeks after my homeschooling experiment began.

My main answer: Although I was never convinced that homeschooling would have large long-run benefits, I was fully convinced that it would have large short-run benefits.

When the book releases, I’ll be running three deep-dive responses to three critics: Nate Hilger, Scott Alexander, and Lyman Stone. Hopefully I can get each of them to write replies and/or do podcasts on these issues. I’ll also be open to all other media; if you want to schedule something now, just email me.

If you happen to feel any gratitude to me, pre-orders are a great help for getting further attention. And if you’ve already got your copy, they make great gifts for every actual and aspiring parent and grandparent, as well as anyone curious about why human beings turn out the way that they do — and anyone worried about the coming population crash. Why not order right now before you forget??? I thank you in advance.

My kids, in contrast, have taken rideshares hundreds of times. Which got me thinking: How typical is my experience? So I went to ChatGPT and asked it to estimate passenger miles traveled in traditional taxis versus rideshares since 2000. The results seem credible, yet they blew my mind. I like the table version best, because it builds suspense.

But you can view it in figure form if you prefer:

This is one of the clearest demonstrations of positive-sum change I know of. Yes, Uber devastated the taxi industry. But they didn’t just “drink their milkshake.” They made six additional milkshakes in the process. The combined effect of a massive price cut and a massive convenience boost multiplied vehicle miles roughly seven-fold. Who would have imagined that demand could be so elastic?

Last week, Alex Tabarrok gave me my first ride in a driverless car. The technology took way too long to arrive thanks to government, lawsuits, and paranoia. But it’s finally here, and it’s fantastic. 9/10. In the next ten years, we’re going to see another Uber-sized revolution in transportation.

Consider: The cheapest self-driving Tesla is a bit under $40k. A car that netted just $100 a day would pay for itself in about one year. Subtracting downtime for charging, they could be on the road 20 hours a day, and probably remain usable for 10 years. Even if they’re empty half the time, and energy and maintenance double the cost of the car itself, the equilibrium price is about $2 an hour. Truly, it wouldn’t be surprising to see paid miles multiply another 7x.

The main risk is that the federal government regulates this technology into the ground. But now that self-driving cars are already on the road, we’ve probably escaped. It’s a perfect time to go full Magneto on the status quo and gloat, “You should killed me when you had the chance!”

1. I have said on the record that “Literally 100% of anti-immigration people I personally know are unpleasant to be around.” I now feel like I personally know Simon Hankinson, and am reconsidering that categorical statement.

2. The reason I’m reconsidering is not that I don’t know if Hankinson is unpleasant. He is not. The reason is that I’m not confident that he’s really anti-immigration! The bedrock for his stance on immigration genuinely seems to be that he thinks existing laws should be enforced regardless of their merits. In Dungeons and Dragons terms, he’s Lawful Neutral: “The rules are the rules, and we have to follow them.”

3. Normally, asserting “The rules are the rules” in an immigration argument is mere pretense. But Hankinson seems like he’d be perfectly fine with more immigration as long as we did it by the book.

4. Hankinson’s top substantive argument against immigration is just that it is bad for native workers who directly compete against immigrants. At UVA last week, for example, he roughly asked, “If we could replace all the employees at UVA with cheaper immigrant workers, should we?” He refers to the affirmative answer as the “libertarian” view, when it’s really just the standard economists’ view (minus a little hemming and hawing). Which is, in turn, the same as the brutally honest view of any rational person! Should we have prevented the mechanization of agriculture to save jobs of farmers? Factories to save the jobs of artisans? The internet to save the jobs of travel agents? Vaccines to save the jobs of morticians? Uber to save the jobs of taxi drivers?

5. The only way to make “saving jobs” rhetorically plausible is to weaponize status quo bias. All the job destruction in the past is fine. It was fine for Uber to hurt taxi drivers. But is it fine for Waymos to hurt Uber drivers? That’s a veeeery complex question that we as a sociiiiiiety need to have a looooooong conversation about.

6. Hankinson accuses those who accept the market’s job destruction of dogmatically assuming that the unemployed readily find better jobs. But that’s a straw man. There are always losers from progress! Always!!! The point, rather, is that progress is awesome overall for almost everyone. The secret of mass consumption is mass production, and distributional concerns are a dangerous distraction. To quote Lucas, “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.”

7. Hankinson admonished students not to freak out over a few grisly deportation stories. Fair enough. But then he tried to freak them out with a few grisly stories about immigration causing job loss, crime, and so on. He even repeatedly voiced the Dadaist, “What if it was you?” when I pointed out that various fears were astronomically rare. Not kosher. The future should not be held hostage to a few stories, however true and sad.

8. Hankinson did make more substantive claims about immigrants’ allegedly horrible overall effects on crime, especially in Sweden. So I checked the numbers. For murder, the most clear-cut statistic, Sweden’s rate is .8/100,000, less than one-fifth the U.S. rate. And even if there was a crisis, Sweden should respond with harsher enforcement for all murderers, not impose collective punishment on high-crime subpopulations.

9. When I discussed the keyhole solution of restricting welfare to immigrants, Hankinson misinterpreted it as a facile, “Simply get rid of the welfare state.” Yes, the welfare state is popular — for natives. However, it is not popular for immigrants. The real problem is that anti-immigration people put almost all of their energy into cutting immigration rather than trying to handle reasonable complaints in a way that pro-immigration people might support. Seriously, if Trump’s central immigration policy had been “Amnesty with a lifetime welfare ban,” it plausibly could have won the support of enough Democrats to break the filibuster. Assuming, of course, that Republicans went along with it.

10. Hankinson often points out that every country restricts immigration, which is of course true. “Is every country on the planet either foolish or evil?” is not a crazy argument, though if you believe in American exceptionalism (as I think Hankinson does) you should feel some cognitive dissonance. What’s bizarre, though, is that Hankinson also specifically points out that the worst countries in the world restrict immigration. That’s plainly an argument (if not a strong one) for doing the opposite.

11. Hankinson warns that “Immigrants will save Social Security” is a “Big Lie.” Given current Social Security policies and the level of immigration, that is indeed an exaggeration. But immigrants do help. And yes, immigration could easily solve the entire problem if you accepted far more while denying them benefits.

12. The silliest thing Hankinson said is that immigration supporters think that “No country is better than any other.” Of course some countries are better than others. And those countries ought to have a lot more people in them.

Not only are EAs extraordinarily likeable; they have also made strong arguments that have causally improved actually-existing philanthropy. Mainstream charities mostly run on a combination of wishful thinking and Social Desirability Bias. As a result, they often do little good or are actively counterproductive. EAs, in contrast, closely study the evidence to figure out how to get the most bang per donor buck. This, in turn, has led to large cash infusions for three charities with demonstrably high benefit/cost ratios: deworming, anti-malaria, and Give Directly. While the typical college EA meeting is just a social club, these social clubs have ultimately made philanthropy better, especially by inspiring tech donors.

But despite their high IQs and winning personalities, EAs are sadly short on common sense. Like other humans, they’re prone to groupthink and paranoia. As a result, many have basically lost interest in philanthropy that demonstrably saves many human lives at low cost, and started obsessing about AI risk.

I’ve already explained at length why I think this is silly. But let me add that AI doomsters’ own behavior shows that deep down, they know they’re being silly. Only two doomsters have been willing to bet me; and yes, you absolutely can bet on the end of the world. The optimist prepays the pessimist, end of story.

Betting aside, if you really thought the world was likely to end, you should be going into massive debt, secure in the knowledge that you won’t have to repay it. But almost no AI doomster — EA or otherwise — does so. I know, they’ve got just-so stories about why they’re not playing the obvious strategy given their stated beliefs. The best explanation, however, is that their stated beliefs are mere lip service.

AI is such a promising technology that EA-inspired efforts to curtail it are likely to outweigh all of the good that EAs achieved back when they sensibly focused on deworming, anti-malaria, and Give Directly. That’s very sad, showing that without common sense, even high-IQ good intentions still pave the path to bad outcomes. But EAs have another set of views which, if taken seriously, wouldn’t merely strangle progress, but make humanity massively worse off: their extreme moral commitment to animal welfare.

Ten years ago, I wrote a reductio ad absurdum of the pro-animal welfare position. If all animals morally matter, what about bugs? At the time, the main response was, “Bugs don’t feel pain.” A decade later, however, plenty of EAs are just embracing the reductio, often with further bizarre epicycles. Unlike their AI doom crusade, however, I’m not even slightly worried about the real-world harm of this failure of common sense. Meat and dairy will remain legal, and bug (and shrimp!) welfare will remain fringe topics of idle intellectual curiosity. While fanatical commitment to bug welfare could easily rationalize all kinds of totalitarian horrors, even the loudest champions of this absurd position take it with a grain of salt.

Let me end by responding to all the EAs who object, “You don’t have an argument, Bryan. Not on AI. Not an bugs.” Because I really do love you guys.

First, the point of an argument is to reason from highly obvious premises to not-so-obvious conclusions. But if your conclusion is extremely non-obvious, then its denial is correspondingly extremely obvious. “If A, therefore B” only works if “Not-B, therefore not-A” isn’t more plausible.

Second, how do you find maximally obvious premises? Not via argument, which is circular, but via common sense. Science rests on the validity of perception, reason, and memory. Morality rests on the value of human well-being and prima face human rights. If you demand an argument for any of these, the right response is: “It’s obvious. The end.” Or as Thomas Reid explains in Essays on the Active Powers of Man:

And when we attempt to prove by direct argument, what is really self-evident, the reasoning will always be inconclusive; for it will either take for granted the thing to be proved, or something not more evident; and so, instead of giving strength to the conclusion, will rather tempt those to doubt of it, who never did so before.

P.S. My decision may have been influenced by Cate Hall’s You Can Just Do Things!

In particular, if you frame policies as “Government should do more X,” “Government should do less X,” and “Government should stay the course,” public opinion data usually reveals that the latter is the median position. And the main counterexample, category-specific spending, usually goes away if you add a reminder along the lines of “Remember, more spending requires more taxes.”

But U.S. politics has grown so weird during the last decade that I suspect a revision to the Median Voter Model is in order. I dub this the Neo-Median Voter Model. It works roughly like this:

1. In primary elections, both parties myopically select their candidates. Partisan voters in both parties pay almost no attention to the impending general election; they vote expressively for whichever candidate most appeals to them.

2. What determines appeal? While policy positions play a role, charisma and name recognition matter more. But again, due to myopia this is not charisma in the eyes of the median voter in the general election. It is charisma in the eyes of the median primary voter.

3. This charisma is extremely scarce. A party is pretty lucky even to have one presidential candidate who seems charismatic to party loyalists. Candidates who actually seem charismatic to the median voter are rarer yet. Since 1980, Reagan, Clinton, and Obama had general charisma. Trump has partisan charisma only. The last election where both parties had a charismatic candidate was 1964, where Johnson (general charisma) clobbered Goldwater (partisan charisma only).

4. After the primaries, both winning candidates make a moderate effort to pretend they’re more mainstream than they really are. But both sides primarily play to their base in the general election.

5. Given this odd candidate selection process, the Median Voter Model still determines the election. The main underlying factors: per Achen and Bartels, economic conditions and peace or lack thereof immediately prior to the election; charisma; and which party’s primary voters’ issue positions are further from the median voter. In that order.

6. Caveat: Voters have a longer memory for inflation than for other economic variables, and they hate inflation.

7. Once a party gains the presidency, they pay much more attention to their base than to the median voter. And the presidency is the main thing that matters for policy. The non-delegation doctrine notwithstanding, Congress has long since delegated most of its power to executive agencies — and presidents have usurped most of the remaining power. The budget is the only notable exception.

8. Thus, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that despite much rhetoric to the contrary, the president is more than halfway to being a four-year dictator. Congress has trouble merely surmounting the filibuster; an actual veto override is almost impossible. Judicial oversight isn’t completely irrelevant, but the system allows presidents to keep imposing the same illegal policies using different legal rationales. Since each Supreme Court challenge takes about a year, you only need three bogus rationalizations to maintain a blatantly illegal policy for your whole term. See Biden on student loans or Trump on tariffs.

9. After three years in power, the next presidential election cycle starts. The primaries myopically select two candidates, and the mechanisms of the Neo-Median Voter Model once again kick in.

Punchline: The traditional Median Voter Model’s central erroneous prediction is platform convergence. In the Neo-Median Voter Model, platforms diverge widely, especially on issues where the base is passionate and the median voter in the general election is apathetic. And it’s amazing how many issues most people are apathetic about. The median voter is pro-choice even in most Republican states, but very few Republicans are going to vote for Democrats over abortion. They can be annoyed for a week or a month over pro-life policies, but not a year, and definitely not permanently.

Is the Neo-Median Voter Model bad news? Probably. It means that the famed checks and balances of the U.S. Constitution are now mostly impotent. But the really bad news comes from studying primary voters. The Democratic Socialists of America and the national conservatives are tiny shares of the population. But they intellectualize the economically illiterate cruelty of their respective party faithful. Never in my lifetime has there been a better time to hate politics.

But love it or hate it, the Neo-Median Voter Model is a good guide to modern American politics. If you know how to make it better, please tell me in the comments.

Update: Jonathan Landy has some similar ideas.

Update #2: Several people have convinced me that Lyndon Johnson was not charismatic in his public persona. My mistake.

After victory, however, conflict with Saddam Hussein persisted for 12 more years. Why? Because although the U.S. had a careful plan for the war, they decided to wing the peace. There was a confused combination of sanctions, no-fly zones, demands for WMD inspections, and periodic bombing. If not for the totally unrelated 9/11 attack, Saddam Hussein might still be in power today. If the U.S. had any plan for peace after the Gulf War, it wasn’t much of a plan.

Poor peacetime planning led to another war — and an even more impressive military master plan. In 2003, using only 250,000 troops, the U.S. achieved full regime change in less than a month. While their list of active allies was much shorter than in 1991, they clearly weren’t necessary.

The shock-and-awe military performance of the U.S. was matched only by its truly harebrained plan for peace. Guerrilla warfare and sectarian violence began almost immediately and lasted for many years. Instead of installing a reliably pro-Western government, the U.S. quickly handed power over to the Shiite Islamist Nouri al-Maliki. He proved to be uncooperative, incompetent, and power-hungry. While he desperately needed U.S. military support, he went out of his way to antagonize his benefactors.

In the same vein, the U.S. had little trouble engineering the military overthrow of the Taliban or Gaddafi. But their plans for post-war Afghanistan and Libya were little more than wishful thinking. And to belabor the obvious, it showed.

You could consider “Since 1990, the U.S. has carefully planned its wars, yet poorly planned for the aftermath” a mixed compliment. But when the lives of millions hang in the balance, it’s a harsh condemnation. Actual war means killing a lot of innocent people — and that cannot be justified unless you have high confidence that the long-run effects are very good. Truly, with great power comes great responsibility.

That has long been my view, and I haven’t changed my mind. But Trump’s Iran War really does put all of the wars of my adult lifetime in a new perspective. Why? Because for the first time in decades, the U.S. has failed even to competently plan for the war! Before February 28, at least Iran wasn’t attacking its Arab neighbors. Oil freely flowed through the Strait of Hormuz. Now, over six months after killing much of the Iranian leadership, the U.S. has no idea how to even get back to square one. Alternating between sour grapes and empty threats may confuse the new Iranian leadership, but that’s about it. I wouldn’t be surprised if this conflict runs into 2028. Nor would I be surprised if the U.S. simply withdraws and hopes that its allies can somehow make peace on their own.

But even if the war ends today with a durable restoration of the pre-war status quo, the U.S. government has reached a new level of negligence. It used to demonstrate selective care: When we fight, we win — and win quickly and decisively; we just don’t know what to do after we win. Now it can’t be negligent after victory, because there will be no victory. Instead of learning from past failures, it has become a model of failure for future leaders to study. If they’re the kind of leaders who bother.

He was great mind, a free spirit, and a true friend.

Hail the victorious dead.

1. Anyone want to do a late meet-up in Cincinnati tonight? I’m available at the Hilton Garden Inn Cincinnati Midtown starting at 9:30 PM. Or we could meet at a nearby restaurant. Ideas? Let me know in the comments.

2. Thursday, I’m speaking at the Affordable Housing Crisis Symposium at Xavier University in Cincinnati alongside Mayor Aftab Purevalon September 17, 8:30 AM-1:30 PM. Please register here.

3. On September 23, I’m debating Simon Hankinson on immigration again, this time at the University of Virginia. Topic: “Do We Need Less Immigration? Or More?” Details here.

4. I’ll be at the University of Wisconsin-Madison from September 30-October 3. Happy to meet for lunch any day while I’m there. And I’ll probably be playing games at the Noble Knight on October 2. Like games? I’m open to requests.

5. I’m doing a roadtrip from Bozeman, Montana to Laramie, Wyoming on October 4-16. Holler if you’re on my path.

6. There’s still a Heterodox Conversation on immigration between me and Garett Jones at the University of Wyoming in Laramie on October 15. Register here.

Textbook asymmetric information models have a response. Namely: While sellers know what quality level they’re producing, customers can’t easily tell. So while they might be happy to pay $500 extra for a product that costs $400 extra to produce, unregulated businesses will try to take advantage of their cluelessness. How? By saying “We spent the extra $400” even though they didn’t. In asymmetric information models, customers are aware of these incentives, so when firms insist “We spent the extra $400,” customers sarcastically respond, “Sure you did.” The end result is that only the lowest quality products get produced.

To be fair, some of the earliest asymmetric information papers admitted that reputation and warranties could be viable free-market solutions to this problem. In practice, however, mainstream economists have long lazily used these models to justify sweeping regulation of product quality to “protect consumers.” While they know the populist “They cut corners to save money” accusation is deeply confused, they still endorse policies inspired by the populist complaint.

A key feature of both populist and textbook complaints: They directly contradict the adage, “You get what you pay for.” Instead, they are stories of market failure, where firms fail to provide high-quality products despite ample consumer demand.

Which raises one big question: Do you really think that the rich cannot get high-quality products? Or to put it more personally: For any given product, could you get it if you were rich?

The question sounds obtuse. Not only can the rich get high-quality products; they obviously do get high-quality products. But if that’s so obvious, not only is the populist complaint totally wrong. The textbook complaint is deeply wrong, too. If rich consumers don’t need government help to get high-quality products, then all the government is protecting ordinary consumers from is the opportunity to save money by sacrificing quality.

Government quality regulations are normally strictest for safety and loosest for sheer luxury and convenience. So we can modify my question to reinforce the point: Do you really think that the rich cannot get all the luxury and convenience they’re willing to pay for? No? Then what’s the point of the strict safety regulation? Markets will happily provide all the safety people are willing to pay for.

In slogan form: “Consumers, not firms, cut corners.”

Does this argument prove too much? For example, does it show that externality problems are somehow fake? Not at all. Consider air pollution. Yes, a superrich person could enjoy clear air by living in the middle of nowhere. But if a rich person is in Los Angeles or Mexico City or Cairo, they still have to breathe the same dirty air as the poor. The same goes for crime: While the rich can pay extra to live in a safe neighborhood, they cannot visit a bad neighborhood and count on their riches to protect them. In fact, their wealth probably puts them at greater risk of being victimized in a high-crime area, because they’re such a tempting target. Try parking a Ferrari in Oakland, California.

“Could you get it if you were rich?” This question is an elegant way to tell the difference between phony and genuine market failures. If you can fix a problem by throwing some of your money at it, the market is working. If many or most people with this option refuse to exercise this option, the problem isn’t the market. It’s scarcity: They’d rather live with the problem and save their money to spend on something else.

P.S. Completely confused? Start here.

The Trials of Dagobah: A LARP for Kids

Intro: (a) Idea of the game: Let’s pretend! (b) Safety rules: Don’t try to hurt anyone, and if you see anyone getting hurt, help them! If you’re hurt or think someone else is, shout PAUSE to pause the game. (c) Don’t be scared! Monsters are just your dads and brothers trying to show kids a fun time. (d) Escape hatch: If you’re scared, just run back to the starting place (the spaceship) until you feel better, then rejoin the game! (e) Rules: Stay with the group, and heed the words of Yoda. When creatures put hands on their heads, pretend they’re not “really” there. When you want to attack something with your light saber, hit it and shout “1 Damage!” (The birthday boy does +1 Damage). If a creature hits you, fall down on the ground AWAY from the fighting. You’ll feel all better once your friends defeat the creature. Then you can wake up and rejoin the game!

Equipment: Yoda and the Padawans have light sabers. Padawans can have masks if they want. Yoda has a flash light, too.

Set-Up: The stairwell lights are on. But the basement is dark, and Padawans may NOT turn on the lights! Depending on outside light, use a blanket to cover the external basement door. The theater door and utility doors are locked, and the spare bedroom is for creatures only. The bathroom is just a bathroom. Tents with a connecting tube block the way between the theater door and the closet door. The trampoline is by the pillar. A ball pit is over by the book shelves.

Creatures: Creatures drop at 0 Life. Snake-Men and the Spider have 3 Life, the Vulture-Man has 4 Life, and the Sith Lords have 7 Life! Snake-Men attack with long foam swords, the Spider with his arms, the Vulture-Man with two pillows, and the Sith Lords with light sabers.

Scene 1: Yoda and Jedi start in the stairwell. Yoda explains they’re all Padawans flying to the swamp planet of Dagobah for Jedi training. Kids sit down on the stairs and make spaceship noises until Yoda says they’ve landed on Dagobah.

Scene 2: Yoda and the Padawans leave their spaceship and enter Dagobah by opening the basement door. Yoda warns the group that hostile Snake-Men will be waiting for them. A first Snake-Man runs around, harrying the Padawans. Then another Snake-Man pops up. Once both have circled around, they attack, and the Padawans have to defeat them!

Scene 3: Yoda tells the Padawans they have to crawl single-file through the Dagobah caves – the tents. He asks for the bravest Padawans to slowly go first! There are lots of (safe) obstructions inside the tents. But when the bravest Padawans emerge, they’re attacked by a Giant Spider! Other Padawans can hurry through to reinforce them if they cry for help.

Scene 4: Once all the Padawans are through, they have to use the Force to leap from tree to tree through the jungle. All the kids jump on the trampoline, then circle around the pillar, over and over, until they reach the mountain-top. One or two more Snake-Man appears mid-way to try to stop the Padawans from climbing the mountain.

Scene 5: Once the kids reach the mountain-top, Yoda hears a loud bird. Oh no, it’s a Vulture-Man! The Vulture-Man swoops over and starts whacking kids with his giant wings (pillows) until he’s defeated.

Scene 6: From the mountain-top, Yoda and the Padawans can see the Clay Springs (the ball pit). Ancient light saber crystals of great power (2 Damage instead of 1 Damage) can be found therein. Two More Snake-Men harry the kids as they hunt for the crystals inside the disgusting goopy springs.

Scene 7: Yoda tells the Padawans they are ready to face their final challenge… alone! He enters the creature room, telling them to stay on their guard as he departs. Heavy breathing and light saber noises come out of the door. Finally the door opens, revealing Darth Veidt and Darth Corruptus, plus other optional creatures. When the Sith Lords fall, Yoda soon re-emerges to congratulate the Padawans on completing their mission, and assures them they will all one day become powerful Jedi Knights!

During the interview, I discovered that Zitelmann is also the world’s leading expert on not only public perceptions of the superrich, but the psychology of the superrich. I’m eager to learn what he’s discovered, and perhaps I’ll do a second interview on that.

How much of that net worth comes from housing? It’s a surprisingly complicated question. If you use exact percentiles, you wind up basing your answer on how much home equity the one household at the 25th percentile of total net worth happens to hold. To get a meaningful answer, then, you’ve got to switch to bands of net worth, then take an average. Here’s what you get:

I honestly found the results a little puzzling, but they check out. In the cells that read $0, literally zero households have any home equity. And the overall patterns are still eye-opening:

1. Age is the great underrated factor. If you want to know how much home equity someone owns, knowing their percentile for their age is less informative than simply knowing their age. Almost everyone starts with low housing wealth, yet a large majority end up with massive housing wealth.

2. Total net worth falls slightly with age. Housing wealth, in contrast, doesn’t seem to fall at all. On average, Americans do not cash out their homes for living expenses, even though modern financial markets make it easy to do so via negative mortgages, home equity loans, and simple downsizing. Instead, the American elderly sit on their massive housing wealth until they die.

3. Without Social Security, permanently sitting on massive housing wealth would be hard to do! For the 25th-75th percentiles of total net worth, housing is their main asset. To live at all comfortably without Social Security, most of these people would have to rely on their housing wealth. Horrors? Au contraire. This wouldn’t just be better for taxpayers; it would be better for young families, who could move into the homes of the elderly when they downsize to pay for their retirements.

4. While total housing wealth naturally rises with total net worth, it falls as a share of net worth. The very poor rent. The middle class lives in their main asset. The upper-middle class and rich own great homes, but have plenty of other assets to live off of in retirement.

5. “Paying off your mortgage” early is a common financial priority for the middle class. But given the mortgage interest deduction, it’s probably a foolish priority. Instead, they should make the minimum monthly payment on their mortgages, then invest their excess savings in a diversified portfolio of stocks and other high-yield assets. That’s exactly what I did, and the results speak for themselves. While I won’t own my home outright until I’m 80, my net worth is much higher than it would have been if I fetishized being “debt-free.”