[Backstory: Soon before his trial, Socrates bumps into his frenemy Leonidas in the Athens city square. After exchanging pleasantries, Leonidas notices a group of Egyptian street-sweepers.]
Leonidas: Can you believe the monstrous way we Greeks treat the Egyptians?
Socrates: Maybe. What is the monstrous way we Greeks treat the Egyptians?
Leonidas: Greek employers horribly discriminate against them in hiring.
Socrates: Such a relief. I thought we were enslaving them.
Leonidas: Not lately, no. But we might as well enslave them. Egyptians are stuck doing the very worst jobs in our society.
Socrates: So workers with the very worst jobs happen to toil under our least-unfair employers? Most strange.
Leonidas: [frustrated] I’m not even going to engage that, Socrates. You’re ignoring my central point.
Socrates: Namely?
Leonidas: That the average Egyptian worker endures horrible discrimination at Greek hands.
Socrates: How do you know that?
Leonidas: Open your eyes! [He waves in the direction of the street-sweepers.] Egyptians are much more likely to do hard, low-paid jobs than Greeks.
Socrates: Agreed. How, though, does that show “discrimination”?
Leonidas: [stunned] Isn’t it obvious?
Socrates: Hardly. Suppose the two of us were standing at the finish line of a marathon, keeping time.
Leonidas: Very well.
Socrates: Suppose further than out of the first hundred runners in the race, only two are Egyptian. One possible explanation for their poor performance, granted, is “discrimination.” For example, the judges could give Egyptian competitors unfavorable starting positions. But there are plainly other ways to account for their subpar performance.
Leonidas: Such as…?
Socrates: You tell me.
Leonidas: Perhaps… Greeks practice running more. We “try harder.”
Socrates: We did invent the marathon, after all. Can you think of any other explanations?
Leonidas: Well, uh…
Socrates: I promise I won’t repeat a word you say.
Leonidas: [grumpily] I guess you could say that Greeks just have more running ability.
Socrates: A distinct possibility.
Leonidas: So you’re justifying the mistreatment of Egyptian workers?
Socrates: Not at all. I’m trying to discover the extent to which Egyptian workers are mistreated.
Leonidas: You’re heartless, Socrates.
Socrates: Perhaps I am. Yet my fear, Leonidas, is that you are being reckless.
Leonidas: Me, reckless?!
Socrates: If three men were suspected of murder, would you interview only one?
Leonidas: Of course not.
Socrates: Suppose you discovered that the first suspect had a hand in the crime. Would you close the investigation?
Leonidas: Again, no.
Socrates: Why not?
Leonidas: [rolling his eyes] Because the first man might have committed the murder in concert with one or both of the other suspects.
Socrates: Would you call an investigator who ignored this possibilities “reckless”?
Leonidas: [weary] Yes, Socrates.
Socrates: What if, similarly, there are three possible explanations for Egyptians’ poor labor performance in the labor market? Should you investigate each?
Leonidas: If you insist, Socrates.
Socrates: Should you investigate the possibility that each of the three possible explanations is partly responsible?
Leonidas: Your analogy is broken, Socrates.
Socrates: Ah, then kindly repair it.
Leonidas: This is more like a case where we see one man murder another in broad daylight. Go to any place of business —and behold the mistreatment of Egyptians with your own eyes.
Socrates: Very well, suppose you’re correct. What should be done to correct this grave injustice?
Leonidas: Let’s ban discrimination.
Socrates: Who is the “us”?
Leonidas: Why, we Greeks, of course.
Socrates: And how exactly shall we effect the ban?
Leonidas: The quality of our Greek judicial system is famous throughout the world, Socrates.
Socrates: A great comfort; I’m coming to trial soon myself!
Leonidas: Your case will probably be thrown out of court any day.
Socrates: As you say, Leonidas. But please walk me through the legal process you propose.
Leonidas: ‘Twould be a delight. In my system, any Egyptian will have a right to sue any employer for discrimination. If convicted, the employer will not only be required to give the Egyptian the job he deserves. He will also owe him a large pile of drachmas to compensate him for insult and injury. We can do it, Socrates. Let’s ban discrimination.
Socrates: I understand. And who will decide whether the accused is guilty?
Leonidas: I thought you were a learned man, Socrates. Who decides guilt? The same people who decide in any case: the jury.
Socrates: The jurors will be Egyptians?
Leonidas: [pause] Rarely. Egyptians are, after all, a minority of our society.
Socrates: So when an Egyptian accuses a Greek employer of discrimination, Greek jurors will normally adjudicate his guilt?
Leonidas: I see no alternative.
Socrates: I see several, but let’s stick with your proposal. Why, in your view, do Greek employers so pervasively discriminate against Egyptians?
Leonidas: Because they are wicked. Unfair. Full of hate against the Egyptian people.
Socrates: Such nefarious motives arise because they are employers?
Leonidas: [puzzled] No, Socrates. Because they are Greeks in a Greek supremacist society.
Socrates: So the same immoral motives drive the average Greek?
Leonidas: That’s Greek supremacy for you.
Socrates: Leonidas, could you please remind me how our system selects jurors?
Leonidas: Randomly. By lot. That’s what makes it fair.
Socrates: So the jurors will, like employers, be “wicked, unfair, and full of hate against the Egyptian people”?
Leonidas: It’s possible, but unlikely.
Socrates: It is “unlikely” that most people randomly selected from a “Greek supremacist” population will be Greek supremacists? Though I’m no mathematician, I can’t help but believe the opposite.
Leonidas: You’re being facile, Socrates. Serving on a jury elevates one’s judgment.
Socrates: While hiring and managing employees does not?
Leonidas: [self-satisfied] Correct. Hiring and managing employees degrades one’s judgment.
Socrates: Quite odd.
Leonidas: How so, Socrates?
Socrates: Picture an excellent Egyptian worker. An employer discriminates against him. If a juror acquits the employer, what does the juror lose?
Leonidas: The satisfaction of righting a grave wrong?
Socrates: Very well. And when the employer discriminated against the worker, what did he lose?
Leonidas: [wary] The satisfaction of doing the right thing?
Socrates: Did he not also lose the profit of hiring an excellent worker?
Leonidas: Yes, that too.
Socrates: So when they tolerate discrimination, both jurors and employers forego moral satisfaction. But only employers suffer financially.
Leonidas: That seems correct.
Socrates: Now picture an incompetent Egyptian worker. An employer judges him fairly, but he takes advantage of your discrimination ban to sue his employer for discrimination.
Leonidas: No system is perfect, Socrates. People also falsely accuse others of murder, let you still support laws against murder, do you not?
Socrates: Bear with me, Leonidas; I’m making a different point. My hypothetical Egyptian comes to court with his false accusation. What does the jury lose if it convicts the employer anyway?
Leonidas: Again, it loses the satisfaction of righting a grave wrong.
Socrates: Will it, though? The jury could feel righteous self-satisfaction even if the employer is, in fact, innocent.
Leonidas: A rather pessimistic view, Socrates.
Socrates: Perhaps, but let’s continue. When the employer refused in good conscience to hire the incompetent Egyptian worker fairly, what did he lose?
Leonidas: [confused] Nothing?
Socrates: Well, he still pays the damages awarded by the jury, no? And may even be required to hire or promote the incompetent worker as well.
Leonidas: Where are you going with all this, Socrates?
Socrates: You grow impatient with our conversation?
Leonidas: [frankly] I do.
Socrates: Very well. You condemn our society as “Greek supremacist,” then propose a system where overwhelmingly Greek jurors decide whether overwhelmingly Greek employers discriminate against Egyptian workers. If you’re right about our society, I don’t see how “banning discrimination” helps. Jurors will just rule in favor of employers regardless of the facts.
Leonidas: You’re oversimplifying, Socrates.
Socrates: Perhaps, but you did ask me to get to the point.
Leonidas: Then get to it.
Socrates: To repeat: If you’re right about our society, you’re proposal won’t help.
Leonidas: Well, perhaps I’m wrong about our society. I’m Greek, and I care about Egyptians. I’m hardly alone.
Socrates: That’s when the analysis gets interesting. Suppose an employer says, “I didn’t discriminate,” but a jury says, “Yes, you did.” Why should we side with the jury rather than the employer?
Leonidas: [exasperated] Because the jurors are the disinterested parties, of course!
Socrates: Both jurors and employers potentially gain moral satisfaction from doing the right thing, no?
Leonidas: Yes, but at least the jurors aren’t motivated by financial gain.
Socrates: Now I’m truly confused.
Leonidas: What now, Socrates?
Socrates: Early on, we named three possible explanations for Egyptians’ lack of success. Discrimination was one. Lower effort was another. Lower ability was the third.
Leonidas: Back to that, are we?
Socrates: We also agreed that, financially speaking, an employer’s best path is to judge workers on their merits. When a jury finds an employer guilty of discrimination, that’s another way of stating, “The defendant failed to maximize profits.”
Leonidas: Alright.
Socrates: Now consider. Suppose two men are arguing about whether a business decision is prudent. One proverbially has “skin in the game.” His own fortune is on the line. The other is an inexperienced observer. Which of the two is more “disinterested”?
Leonidas: The latter.
Socrates: Yet whose judgment do you trust more?
Leonidas: [pause] The former’s.
Socrates: As do I, Leonidas. A disinterested observer is more reliable than someone who profits by bending the truth. But someone who profits by reaching the truth is more reliable than a disinterested observer.
Leonidas: And employers profit by reaching the truth?
Socrates: Once they are accused of discrimination, they obviously want to be acquitted, regardless of the facts. But when they make the employment decisions that give rise to cases in the first place, employers do indeed profit by reaching the truth. So why should I prefer the judgment of the jurors who second-guess the employer’s initial decision?
Leonidas: You assume that employers always know better.
Socrates: I do not. I only assume that employers generally know better.
Leonidas: You assume that jurors are never fairer than employers.
Socrates: I do not. I only assume that jurors are not generally fairer than employers.
Leonidas: So you grant that in certain circumstances, my proposal would function as proposed.
Socrates: Absolutely. Nevertheless, your proposal is, on balance, worse than nothing.
Leonidas: [taken aback] That hardly seems fair, Socrates.
Socrates: Leonidas, you start by painting a grim picture of our “Greek supremacist society.” If you were correct, any sensible Egyptian worker would tell himself, “What’s the point of filing a lawsuit? The jury will be just as unfair as my employer.”
Leonidas: I already admitted that I exaggerated. Can’t we move on?
Socrates: Relax, I’m recapping. If Greeks are better than you say, a sensible Egyptian workers might indeed want to sue. The question is: Why should an outside observer trust the jury over the employer?
Leonidas: And you trust the employer more, because he was the one who had “skin in the game” when he made the initial employment decisions that led to the lawsuit?
Socrates: Exactly.
Leonidas: You can’t see the fatal flaw in your argument?
Socrates: Please help me do so, Leonidas.
Leonidas: You only compare the trustworthiness of employers versus jurors. But what about the trustworthiness of the Egyptian workers? They, too, have “skin in the game.”
Socrates: [speechless]
Leonidas: Ha, got you, Socrates!
Socrates: [confused] In a sense, you’re right…
Leonidas: [gloating] Just concede, “You’re right, I’m wrong” so we can go home.
Socrates: [regains composure] A worker does indeed have a strong financial incentive to get hired. But this incentive is just as strong for an incompetent worker as for a competent one.
Leonidas: [squints while listening intently]
Socrates: [thinking aloud] In fact, an incompetent worker probably has a stronger incentive to get any particular job, because his other employment options are likely to be worse!
Leonidas: So we should trust employers over workers?!
Socrates: On the question, “Is this worker profitable to employ?,” absolutely. How could anyone think otherwise?
Leonidas: [angry] You’re even worse than a Greek supremacist, Socrates. You’re a full-blown plutocrat!
Socrates: Feel free to elaborate next time, Leonidas. We probably won’t get to talk again until after my trial.
Leonidas: [semi-sympathetic] Don’t worry, plutocrat. The system works.
Socrates: [waves farewell and walks off]
Socrates argues his case flawlessly, but the truth is that in the real world nobody who supports affirmative action begins with his priors. In particular, "businesses should maximise profit and anything that stops them doing this is bad" is something that absolutely nobody who supports affirmative action believes. The people who think that employment discrimination is bad don't get there because they're worried about business owners not operating as rationally self-interested profit-maximising agents.
Would it be possible to construct such a strong case against affirmative action, starting from liberal-left assumptions? You touched on it a little I suppose, when you pointed out that the justice system itself would be just as prone to discrimination as the business owners if not more.
How long after barriers to Jews getting into ivy league school were lifted did it take for them to be overrepresented?
How long after barriers to Black men getting into the NBA were lifted did it take for them to be overrepresented?