I have a quibble with #5 where the person is someone who took an oath to "faithfully execute" the office of president and "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution. It seems weird to me that there would be an implied "but I get to unilaterally decide which laws I will enforce based on my view of whether or not they are extremely unjust" in those promises. So while I accept your list with respect to people who haven't - in exchange for considerable power - agreed to be bound by a Constitution that doesn't give the president or his appointees the power to unilaterally decide to disregard laws, for those who have, it seems to me there's something missing from your formulation. Which means that people who don't want to enforce laws they view as extremely unjust shouldn't seek or hold offices that require them to swear such oaths but instead dedicate themselves to getting rid of the extremely unjust laws by persuading enough people of the unjustness that the laws are repealed.
Well put. It really is a serious question about which should take precedence, not enforcing laws you consider unjust vs not adhering to your oath to enforce laws passed through the proper means. I am not sure I have seen a good discussion of the tension, and what the proper outcome should be. I suppose it must come down a lot to how good your judgement is, and there isn't a good way other than just doing what you think is best. But that's for the individual... at the societal level, it might be a question of not creating such laws (or allowing such broad action) that there would be much room for disagreement over the justness of those laws, but that is difficult to say the least.
So I'm trying to understand this through an example...
Someone in one US state where abortion is legal, can believe that pro-abortion law is an unjust law and therefore prevents a woman in a high-risk pregnancy from getting an abortion (Thesis #3?). That pregnant woman then dies from complications of that pregnancy, but the person who blocked it would evade punishment (thesis 4?) assuming due to them believing it was an unjust law? And if it went to court, then a judge or jury would not enforce any punishment if they believed it was unjust? (thesis 5?)
At the same time, someone in a different US state where abortion is illegal could believe it is unjust to prevent a woman whose life is in jeopardy from getting an abortion. I can picture thesis 3, 4, and 5 applying with the reverse results
I am not trying to debate abortion, rather I am trying to pick a hot topic where people have deep moral beliefs that are in conflict. Who is deciding what is moral or unjust? If it is up to the person acting, then does everyone who truly believes in their position get a pass?
Or am I not understanding how to apply these theses?
I appreciate this argument. It also raises some questions for me. Given that laws are often institutionalized versions of morality, how is it possible that "extremely unjust laws" came to exist at all? I think the answer lies in the possibility that moral sentiments and feelings apparently evolved (in the biological sense) to reduce destructiveness and encourage cooperation within small social groups. Therefore, behavior that feels morally wrong for one's own group (e.g., slavery, genocide) might feel okay or even desirable if directed against a foreign out-group. Waging war against out-groups and enslaving people from outgroups is an historical human universal. These behaviors eventually came to be seen as morally repugnant (and laws supporting these practices "extremely unjust") only when "foreigners" are no longer perceived as a dehumanized outgroup. People who regard immigrants as members of a subhuman outgroup will, of course, be happy to employ current laws to justify treating them differently from citizens. The immigration laws might seem "extremely unjust" to those who do not see immigrants as members of the outgroup. It's not that certain moral positions are "objectively true" (which would provide a standard for judging the justness of laws). It's a question of whether the quasi-consensual agreement about what is moral (as hypothesized by Haidt, for example) will be applied to all human beings, not just those of a certain ethnicity or country of origin.
The touchstone for immigration law, I submit, should not be what's best for would-be immigrants to a particular country but what's in the best interest of its current citizens. Further, I submit that anyone who advocates or promotes in-migration that disserves the interest of a majority of his fellow-citizens is a traitor, regardless of his rationale for doing so.
The question of unjust laws get settled ex post, at the end of the war (sometimes figurative, other times real ones as in the case of the nazis and us slavery). In the moment by definition you have differering viewpoints (otherwise there would be consensus to change the laws) and you can't be sure that history (again, the name says it all) will be on your side. With a different industrial setup both the nazis and the confederates could conveivably have won. Stalin and Mao weren't noticeably better and didnt get punished. There are crackpots that think that personal income tax laws are unjust, should we just give them a pass not paying taxes? How about people who don't believe there should be restrictions on gun ownership? If you believe so strongly in something you are willing to break the law for it, or encourage politicians to do same, good for you we need people of conviction, but it's only fair for you also to bear the consequences. Maybe one day you get exonerated, maybe not.
Well, on the point of how does fighting justify morality, i notice that war winners have disproportionately morality on their side afterwards. There were people even in ancient greece and rome that were against slavery, but we dont necessarily consider all other greeks / romans as immoral and clamor to remove their statues.
I think what you mean is "have popular opinion on their side". But you are not fooled by this right? You still think slavery is wrong, even if the slavers win?
"Bearing the consequences" might not imply bearing them voluntarily, or deliberately. It might be resigning oneself to doing so if and as caught (anyway).
>To deny #6, similarly, commits you to the view that the Nuremberg Trials were morally impermissible.
Do you seriously think that the Holocaust was legal in Nazi law? Of course not, they were trying to hide it. Can you seriously imagine making such a law and not having a gigantic revolution? They were trying to hide it even from SS-judges. Dude wanted to arrest Eichmann when he found out... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Konrad_Morgen . Discrimination and labour camps were legal, mass murder was illegal and done in secret.
As a general role, totalitarian, authoritarian or generally shitty governments are organized crime. They are breaking their own laws. Stalin's Constitution for the Soviet Union guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly etc. of course the reality was the opposite.
Similarly, a proper democracy is not simply a country that has nicer laws than an autocracy, but one that obeys and enforces its laws.
In other words, democracy is order and dictatorship is chaos and it is a very sad joke that nearly everybody understands it the other way around.
Laws supporting slavery were not unjust. Slavery an almost universal practice for 1000's of years. Certain religions practiced children sacrifice. They didn't consider it unjust. No one wanted to be a slave but everyone wanted slaves. Slaves meant wealth, power. Slavery was based not on color or race but who won and who lost a conflict. After Troy the Greeks took the remaining Trojans back to Greece as slaves. Spoils of war. If the Trojans had won they would have enslaved the Greeks.
The laws became unjust only when slavery became unjust.
This is now. That was then.
What was considered just and unjust were different.
Silly argument re immigration laws as they can be changed peacefully and democratically, and we are all free to advocate for that. That’s a better outcome than everyone individually deciding what laws to obey, which is a recipe for anarchy.
Is it morally permissible for a nation’s leaders who have pledged to protect citizens to try to keep out immigrants who, for example, are members of violent gangs, are members of terrorist organizations, or have communicable diseases?
If so, then how are they to accomplish this without vetting the people who want to cross the border? If it’s morally acceptable to do so, then what are the morally acceptable ways that they can accomplish this?
Does there not need to be some way of preventing people to cross the border without being vetted? If so, does there not need to be a gateway at which people’s requests to enter can be reviewed? If so, given that resources are scarce, doesn’t there need to be a way to meter the flow of people so as to not overwhelm the system?
And, when people violate the rules and enter without review, is it morally permissible to make them leave and return in accordance with the rules?
Okay, I have rented Huemer’s book on Kindle (because $22+ seemed too pricey, for now) and I presume that quibbles over Thesis #6 are resolved there. But maybe not, so maybe I am accepting the dare, depending on what is meant by “punish” and what is meant by “enforce.” If something as small as expressing mild disapproval counts as punishment, then I do not dare to contest the thesis, so long as “enforcing” means something like ‘voluntarily and knowingly engaging in action that directly assures that the extremely unjust law is executed with substantial consequences to the victim.’ Otherwise, there is the problem of punishing coerced compliance with the enforcement system. In fact, now that I think of it, coerced compliance may also mean that Thesis #5 is disputable, too.
I have a quibble with #5 where the person is someone who took an oath to "faithfully execute" the office of president and "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution. It seems weird to me that there would be an implied "but I get to unilaterally decide which laws I will enforce based on my view of whether or not they are extremely unjust" in those promises. So while I accept your list with respect to people who haven't - in exchange for considerable power - agreed to be bound by a Constitution that doesn't give the president or his appointees the power to unilaterally decide to disregard laws, for those who have, it seems to me there's something missing from your formulation. Which means that people who don't want to enforce laws they view as extremely unjust shouldn't seek or hold offices that require them to swear such oaths but instead dedicate themselves to getting rid of the extremely unjust laws by persuading enough people of the unjustness that the laws are repealed.
Well put. It really is a serious question about which should take precedence, not enforcing laws you consider unjust vs not adhering to your oath to enforce laws passed through the proper means. I am not sure I have seen a good discussion of the tension, and what the proper outcome should be. I suppose it must come down a lot to how good your judgement is, and there isn't a good way other than just doing what you think is best. But that's for the individual... at the societal level, it might be a question of not creating such laws (or allowing such broad action) that there would be much room for disagreement over the justness of those laws, but that is difficult to say the least.
If only everyone agreed with you on the meaning of extremely unjust laws.
So I'm trying to understand this through an example...
Someone in one US state where abortion is legal, can believe that pro-abortion law is an unjust law and therefore prevents a woman in a high-risk pregnancy from getting an abortion (Thesis #3?). That pregnant woman then dies from complications of that pregnancy, but the person who blocked it would evade punishment (thesis 4?) assuming due to them believing it was an unjust law? And if it went to court, then a judge or jury would not enforce any punishment if they believed it was unjust? (thesis 5?)
At the same time, someone in a different US state where abortion is illegal could believe it is unjust to prevent a woman whose life is in jeopardy from getting an abortion. I can picture thesis 3, 4, and 5 applying with the reverse results
I am not trying to debate abortion, rather I am trying to pick a hot topic where people have deep moral beliefs that are in conflict. Who is deciding what is moral or unjust? If it is up to the person acting, then does everyone who truly believes in their position get a pass?
Or am I not understanding how to apply these theses?
I appreciate this argument. It also raises some questions for me. Given that laws are often institutionalized versions of morality, how is it possible that "extremely unjust laws" came to exist at all? I think the answer lies in the possibility that moral sentiments and feelings apparently evolved (in the biological sense) to reduce destructiveness and encourage cooperation within small social groups. Therefore, behavior that feels morally wrong for one's own group (e.g., slavery, genocide) might feel okay or even desirable if directed against a foreign out-group. Waging war against out-groups and enslaving people from outgroups is an historical human universal. These behaviors eventually came to be seen as morally repugnant (and laws supporting these practices "extremely unjust") only when "foreigners" are no longer perceived as a dehumanized outgroup. People who regard immigrants as members of a subhuman outgroup will, of course, be happy to employ current laws to justify treating them differently from citizens. The immigration laws might seem "extremely unjust" to those who do not see immigrants as members of the outgroup. It's not that certain moral positions are "objectively true" (which would provide a standard for judging the justness of laws). It's a question of whether the quasi-consensual agreement about what is moral (as hypothesized by Haidt, for example) will be applied to all human beings, not just those of a certain ethnicity or country of origin.
The touchstone for immigration law, I submit, should not be what's best for would-be immigrants to a particular country but what's in the best interest of its current citizens. Further, I submit that anyone who advocates or promotes in-migration that disserves the interest of a majority of his fellow-citizens is a traitor, regardless of his rationale for doing so.
Nuremberg Trials were a _legal_ farce. Not everything that's legal is moral, and not everything that's moral is legal.
The question of unjust laws get settled ex post, at the end of the war (sometimes figurative, other times real ones as in the case of the nazis and us slavery). In the moment by definition you have differering viewpoints (otherwise there would be consensus to change the laws) and you can't be sure that history (again, the name says it all) will be on your side. With a different industrial setup both the nazis and the confederates could conveivably have won. Stalin and Mao weren't noticeably better and didnt get punished. There are crackpots that think that personal income tax laws are unjust, should we just give them a pass not paying taxes? How about people who don't believe there should be restrictions on gun ownership? If you believe so strongly in something you are willing to break the law for it, or encourage politicians to do same, good for you we need people of conviction, but it's only fair for you also to bear the consequences. Maybe one day you get exonerated, maybe not.
Crackpot here. Yes, you should give me a pass. Kidnapping and jailing people for money is evil.
"Unjust laws get settled at the end of a war"
How does fighting settle questions of morality?
"It's only fair if you bear the consequences"
But that is exactly the question in dispute.
Well, on the point of how does fighting justify morality, i notice that war winners have disproportionately morality on their side afterwards. There were people even in ancient greece and rome that were against slavery, but we dont necessarily consider all other greeks / romans as immoral and clamor to remove their statues.
I think what you mean is "have popular opinion on their side". But you are not fooled by this right? You still think slavery is wrong, even if the slavers win?
"Bearing the consequences" might not imply bearing them voluntarily, or deliberately. It might be resigning oneself to doing so if and as caught (anyway).
Imagine if a robber/kidnapper said, "this will only be fair if I end up with your money and you end up locked in my basement"
>To deny #6, similarly, commits you to the view that the Nuremberg Trials were morally impermissible.
Do you seriously think that the Holocaust was legal in Nazi law? Of course not, they were trying to hide it. Can you seriously imagine making such a law and not having a gigantic revolution? They were trying to hide it even from SS-judges. Dude wanted to arrest Eichmann when he found out... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Konrad_Morgen . Discrimination and labour camps were legal, mass murder was illegal and done in secret.
As a general role, totalitarian, authoritarian or generally shitty governments are organized crime. They are breaking their own laws. Stalin's Constitution for the Soviet Union guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly etc. of course the reality was the opposite.
Similarly, a proper democracy is not simply a country that has nicer laws than an autocracy, but one that obeys and enforces its laws.
In other words, democracy is order and dictatorship is chaos and it is a very sad joke that nearly everybody understands it the other way around.
Laws supporting slavery were not unjust. Slavery an almost universal practice for 1000's of years. Certain religions practiced children sacrifice. They didn't consider it unjust. No one wanted to be a slave but everyone wanted slaves. Slaves meant wealth, power. Slavery was based not on color or race but who won and who lost a conflict. After Troy the Greeks took the remaining Trojans back to Greece as slaves. Spoils of war. If the Trojans had won they would have enslaved the Greeks.
The laws became unjust only when slavery became unjust.
This is now. That was then.
What was considered just and unjust were different.
I agree with all 6 of your points.
But I disagree profoundly that the laws Obama ignored are “extremely unjust.”
You can argue that they are unjust. Reasonable people could disagree on that, to be sure.
But on what basis do you claim that the laws in question are “extremely unjust”?
Silly argument re immigration laws as they can be changed peacefully and democratically, and we are all free to advocate for that. That’s a better outcome than everyone individually deciding what laws to obey, which is a recipe for anarchy.
Is it morally permissible for a nation’s leaders who have pledged to protect citizens to try to keep out immigrants who, for example, are members of violent gangs, are members of terrorist organizations, or have communicable diseases?
If so, then how are they to accomplish this without vetting the people who want to cross the border? If it’s morally acceptable to do so, then what are the morally acceptable ways that they can accomplish this?
Does there not need to be some way of preventing people to cross the border without being vetted? If so, does there not need to be a gateway at which people’s requests to enter can be reviewed? If so, given that resources are scarce, doesn’t there need to be a way to meter the flow of people so as to not overwhelm the system?
And, when people violate the rules and enter without review, is it morally permissible to make them leave and return in accordance with the rules?
Now discuss Socrates' counter claims in Crito.
Okay, I have rented Huemer’s book on Kindle (because $22+ seemed too pricey, for now) and I presume that quibbles over Thesis #6 are resolved there. But maybe not, so maybe I am accepting the dare, depending on what is meant by “punish” and what is meant by “enforce.” If something as small as expressing mild disapproval counts as punishment, then I do not dare to contest the thesis, so long as “enforcing” means something like ‘voluntarily and knowingly engaging in action that directly assures that the extremely unjust law is executed with substantial consequences to the victim.’ Otherwise, there is the problem of punishing coerced compliance with the enforcement system. In fact, now that I think of it, coerced compliance may also mean that Thesis #5 is disputable, too.
I probably would (have?) deployed an unjust law to punish a person for reasons unrelated to the law in question.
Damn me to Hell for that.
See ya there.