Isn't all of this evident for someone who pays attention on X? I don't think I saw an original argument or insight here.
As for Chauvin and Floyd, that claim looks like Gell-Mann amnesia to me. It's not clear to me that Chauvin made any difference: Floyd had a lethal dose of fentanyl in his system and we don't have the counterfactual - he could easily have died in the back of the police car.
I found Huemer through Caplan, and now read much more Huemer than Caplan. Both, like all human beings, have their flaws, but are also great. Huemer rarely misses, and that's hard to find for someone who produces as much output as he does.
"The IPCC projects that an excess 250,000 people will die annually worldwide." I hope that Michael goes on to point out all the lives that are SAVED by warming and by more CO2. If not, that's a serious lack. Overall, it looks highly likely that warming & more CO2 will save lives.
Among Michael Huemer's books I've read are the four you mention. He's my favorite living philosopher. I'm surprised at Tyler Cowen's response to"Progressive Myths." I agree with you about the book. I had previously fallen for a few of those myths.
Thanks for the reading recommendation Bryan. Fortunately Huemer and the rest of the world face immense competition from other authors. There is currently a deluge of recommended reading. Knowing who to read next is now more important than ever. Unfortunately Huemer's posts regarding Trump over the past few months make me somewhat untrustworthy of him. Caplan on the other hand didn't make any mistakes blogging about Trump during the election. One point Bryan. I still trust Bryan Caplan and will continue to read his work, but I'm skeptical of some of his reading recommendations. Huemer has fallen a notch or two in my pile of things to read next. Sorry for the poor review, but I'm just here to tell the truth. Shall I get into your recommendation to read Hanania or should I save that for another time?
What do you find problematic with Huemer's arguments against Trump? You can be skeptical about Trump doing something significant against democracy again, but there's a strong case proving he made a significant effort to stay in power in the last election even when he lost.
What could be worse than endangering American democracy? Even abortion or woke ideology cannot compare to the undermining of American democracy. Again, you could say that it is improbable that Trump will undermine our political system and cause the worst constitutional crisis in history. But he will surely make it more probable that the next authoritarian president will do that. Even more concerning is that almost no intelligent Trump supporter has talked about this. Even if I could have voted for Trump because I think it's improbable he'll do that, I would have appreciated Mike's thought-provoking articles against Trump. He is not a man usually given to confusion. He is certainly one of the best people to read on philosophy and politics.
If Vote_for_Trump > Vote_for_Harris then vote for Trump.
Within Huemer's Costs_Voting_Trump term is a really tiny probability of damage to the Republic multiplied by a very large cost.
Like so: Probability_of_Trump'sActions_Damaging_Republic * Cost_Damage_to_Republic.
You and I both agree that Cost_Damage_to_Republic is large, but more significantly I don't believe, and most people don't believe that the Probability_of_Trump'sActions_Damaging_Republic is high. This probability is less than 1%. So small that it doesn't manifest feelings of significant concern for me and probably most other Trump voters.
With that said, Huemer probably came up with the best case for voting for Harris. We can lament the fact that others didn't push this conversation into the debate with more poise. I suppose his contribution is more valuable than I originally realized. But I'm saying this in hindsight after Trump won.
His post was more threatening at the time. My comments were not respectfully received on his Substack. Fortunately, Huemer dealt with those commenters.
Going forward though, Huemer has still sunk a point or two on my scale of people to trust. The issue regarding the alleged coup is a perfect example. I really didn't want to dig through all the detail regard the so called coup. Much better to rely on people I trust. I called up a trustworthy and avid observer of politics and simply asked, "Do you believe Trump attempted a coup?" The answer was no and he explained why. That was in accordance with my feeling.
So, Huemer might have gained a point for effort, but will have likely lost points for being wrong about the coup threat. Time will tell though. What is the concern about Trump? That his actions will lead others to try similar and more well executed coup attempts? I don't think we can know that.
He was being unbalanced because that was a reasonable position to take. He was trying to be objective, not neutral just like for this book. Trump really is uniquely bad
Some of Huemer's comments verged into the propaganda region. I ought to go find a direct quote, but I am too lazy.
I am thinking of a vague claim that would pass the “objective” fact checkers but clearly attempts to connote more than it literally says. Discussing Trump, H said something like a court had held him liable for sexual assault. So far as I know, Trump has not been convicted or even tried or officially charged with sexual assault. If I had carefully followed the details of the case (I assume it is the porn star thing?), I would know exactly what Huemer is talking about. As it is I do not. Someone paying less attention could easily believe that the accusation is that Trump was convicted of something. If it really is worth mentioning, it seems like it is worth mentioning in a clearer way. If what Trump has actually done is bad enough, exaggerating it or vaguely mis-specifying it to sound worse just sacrifices credibility. If it is not, well, that makes matters worse. I no longer know who to believe when Trump is discussed. His enemies all exaggerate, his allies all minimize, and everyone else is justifiably confused.
That said, Huemer is well worth reading, and one of the top living libertarian philosophers. For me, there is no higher praise for a philosopher. This just illustrates that even the best make mistakes.
The problem is that by the time you get around to debunking the current set of myths, "progressives" have moved on already to lapping up a whole new load of nonsense.
To qualify as the "best book on wokeness," it really ought to spell out the irrational ideological presumptions underpinning how "progressives" and allied collectivist intellectual traditions manufacture their myths, and what sort of psychological and intellectual weaknesses such myths exploit. It then should move on to outlining the intellectual history of "progressive" and related movements to explain how we got to today's wokeness.
*Progressive Myths* sounds like a book that I would very much enjoy. I was so intrigued by the description of this book that I decided to have a look at *Ethical Intuitionism* or, at least the preview on Amazon, as the psychology of morality is one of my specialties. Unfortunately, I was terribly disappointed by Huemer's dismissal of non-cognitivism, which I find the most persuasive meta-ethical position. What is Huemer's main argument that moral statements that are indicative, truth-apt propositions rather than non-truth-apt emotional interjections or imperatives? He says that moral pronouncements represent moral truths because ordinary people have strong, intuitive feelings that their beliefs are moral truths. I'm sorry, but people have strong feelings about many things being true that are not. Ordinary people's strong intuitions about physics, evolution, probabilities, and many more phenomena are way off base. The same is true for intuitions about many psychological phenomena, including morality. Huemer claims that we should accept ordinary intuitions as valid unless we have an explanation for why they would be invalid. Well, I do. I think the invalid intuition that moral truths exist makes people more persuasive in their moral argumentation. Claiming that you should do X because "X is good" is a moral truth is probably more persuasive than claiming that you should do X because "X feels good to me" or "I order you to do X." We know that self-deception helps to make people more convincing, hence the self-deceived belief that one is in possession of moral truth.
Non-cognitivism suffers from a notorious objection called the Frege-Geach problem that he endorses. It’s a compelling objection, and non-cognitivism isn’t this super obvious position that you’re implying it is. He also doesn’t think moral claims are strong intuitively feelings, just strong intuitions like any other a priori intuition. The book goes into more detail.
I am a psychologist, not a philosopher, so perhaps I shouldn’t be getting involved in philosophical arguments. As a psychologist, I am more interested in language pragmatics than semantics. My working assumption is that language in general, and particularly moral language, evolved as a tool used by human beings to influence each others’ behaviors. While it is possible for someone to utter a purely descriptive proposition without an associated explicit or tacit agenda for influencing another person’s behavior, I think such utterances are extremely rare, existing perhaps only in the realm of philosophy and science. Even in those cases, once the philosopher or scientist tries to convince others of the truth of the proposition, pragmatics come into play. So, yes, Frege-Geach identifies a rarified case in which moral statements are treated as if they are propositions in conditional contexts. For me that is totally irrelevant to the way that moral emotions and language evolved through natural selection as a way to regulate and coordinate behavior in our species.
Is there something different about the evolution of factual claims? In that case at least, although language can certainly be used factually to manipulate others, it seems that factual claims can be true or false (but not both or neither) and that i(in those cases) it might be true that knowing the truth might be more useful than believing what is false. Hence we can argue about factual claims when there is a fact of the matter, and show evidence, etc., and it is not purely a power struggle. Why would this be different in the case of moral claims?
Depending on the purpose of making a factual claim, it may or may not serve the same function as making a moral claim. If there is an implicit "should" to a factual claim, it functions just like a moral claim. For example, "It is 0 degrees outside" can imply "You should put on your winter coat if you go outside."
Sorry about the confusion. Propositions (factual claims) are indeed different from imperatives and emotional interjections (which is what I believe moral claims are) in that they are truth-apt. That is, it makes sense to discuss whether a factual claim is true or false. In contrast, it makes no sense to discuss whether an imperative or interjection is true or false because those utterances are not truth-apt. And I agree with you that knowing what is true is usually more useful than holding beliefs that are false.
By the way, I would not describe all conversations between people as "power struggles" (in which people try to make each other do things that they would rather not do). Power struggles do exist. However, conversations are also used for mutual, reciprocal influence to coordinate behavior that benefits all participants in the conversation. Think about a sports team discussing how to keep the other team from scoring. Or hunters discussing how they will surround and kill a prey animal. Or lovers discussing how to have mutually satisfying sex. Or two philosophers discussing a proposition in good faith because they both genuinely want to know the truth.
My expectation is that Tyler will be correct. This book is likely just preaching to the choir. How many progressives will pick up a book that challenges their world view? I'm not saying that conservatives, libertarians, populists, or anyone else would but this book probably won't reach it's intended audience. Maybe it can make non-progressives better debaters.
I'm going to challenge my left-leaning family members to read this book in exchange for reading one of their choosing. I think they will be more receptive to this style of book than an explicitly right-wing takedown of progressive ideology.
I suspect your left-leaning family members will be as unwilling to give this book a fair reading as I was The Bible, when my newly-converted Baptist friend tried to get me to read the damn thing. Even if I had read it, it would have been with a jaundiced eye, constantly looking for things to pick holes with. Still, good luck anyway.
I actually just read a review by Arnold Kling of Progressive Myths and though he was positive, he found two things to gripe about which are non-trivial. One is that Huemer attributes today’s focus on social justice to the leaders of the Rights Movement being unwilling to give up the fight, despite having won it decades ago. Kling thinks it more likely that social justice warriors see the race gap in life outcomes and conclude our society must still be racist. These two views are not the same and the latter strikes me as being more likely.
The second thing Kling points out is that Huemer doesn’t address the black-white IQ gap, which someone like Nathan Cofnas would probably claim is at the bottom of all our disagreements with progressive liberals.
For someone who is probably not as well read as many of your subscribers I found this essay quite as worthwhile and enlightening as I did the comments.
Sex differences in criminal offending actually don't explain sex differences in being fatally shot by police. If you look at racial gaps in being fatally shot by police, these are explained almost perfectly by racial gaps in arrest rates. However, men are only arrested three times as often as women (4x for violent crimes and 10x for homicide), but are killed by police 20 times as often as women!
Now, to be fair to police, it's entirely possible that this is explained by, e.g., men being more likely to act in a way that justifies shooting but doesn't show up in the available data. One clue is that men actually do kill police officers 20 times as often as women.
But it is interesting that the left threw a giant, enormously destructive temper tantrum over racial gaps that can easily be explained by differences in criminal offending while totally ignoring the gender gap that can't.
I love this book but I agree with Tyler. Reasonable minds will be the only ones who read this book. Some opponents may, but only to use it piecemeal against Huemer. The sheeple will continue to go along to get along. The hive mind is for most incurious people their stasis. This book will however arm the few minds who do still ask questions about reality and who always demand answers and evidence to explain it. Just another great book that will be used a hundred or more years from now to show that we simply ignored the facts and denied reason and turned a blind eye as our civilization fell into chaos and ruin.
“I am not the sort of writer who likes to *imply* his point.” A priceless sentence!
I don't know, this is coming awfully close to veneration.
Isn't all of this evident for someone who pays attention on X? I don't think I saw an original argument or insight here.
As for Chauvin and Floyd, that claim looks like Gell-Mann amnesia to me. It's not clear to me that Chauvin made any difference: Floyd had a lethal dose of fentanyl in his system and we don't have the counterfactual - he could easily have died in the back of the police car.
a lethal dose for a first time user or a lethal dose for an active user?
because i'm pretty sure this wasn't floyds first rodeo.
Read the original autopsy.
I have read that Chauvin (accidentally, culpably) asphyxiated Floyd by preventing him from expanding his lungs. Might have been George Will, or ...
I'm not convinced Floyd would have died from his OD, BUT he might have.
I found Huemer through Caplan, and now read much more Huemer than Caplan. Both, like all human beings, have their flaws, but are also great. Huemer rarely misses, and that's hard to find for someone who produces as much output as he does.
"The IPCC projects that an excess 250,000 people will die annually worldwide." I hope that Michael goes on to point out all the lives that are SAVED by warming and by more CO2. If not, that's a serious lack. Overall, it looks highly likely that warming & more CO2 will save lives.
AFAIK he discusses David Friedman’s work on this and agrees that evidence that global warming is bad isn’t really that strong
Among Michael Huemer's books I've read are the four you mention. He's my favorite living philosopher. I'm surprised at Tyler Cowen's response to"Progressive Myths." I agree with you about the book. I had previously fallen for a few of those myths.
Thanks for the reading recommendation Bryan. Fortunately Huemer and the rest of the world face immense competition from other authors. There is currently a deluge of recommended reading. Knowing who to read next is now more important than ever. Unfortunately Huemer's posts regarding Trump over the past few months make me somewhat untrustworthy of him. Caplan on the other hand didn't make any mistakes blogging about Trump during the election. One point Bryan. I still trust Bryan Caplan and will continue to read his work, but I'm skeptical of some of his reading recommendations. Huemer has fallen a notch or two in my pile of things to read next. Sorry for the poor review, but I'm just here to tell the truth. Shall I get into your recommendation to read Hanania or should I save that for another time?
What do you find problematic with Huemer's arguments against Trump? You can be skeptical about Trump doing something significant against democracy again, but there's a strong case proving he made a significant effort to stay in power in the last election even when he lost.
The magnitude, scope and threat of the alleged attempted coup doesn’t manifest feelings of significant concern in me or a majority of voters.
Okay, so what? The point is that it should. An authoritarian trying to forcibly stay in power is really bad.
"The point is that it should. An authoritarian trying to forcibly stay in power is really bad."
"Should" according to an ideal. But reality causes us to ask, "Ask compared to what?"
What could be worse than endangering American democracy? Even abortion or woke ideology cannot compare to the undermining of American democracy. Again, you could say that it is improbable that Trump will undermine our political system and cause the worst constitutional crisis in history. But he will surely make it more probable that the next authoritarian president will do that. Even more concerning is that almost no intelligent Trump supporter has talked about this. Even if I could have voted for Trump because I think it's improbable he'll do that, I would have appreciated Mike's thought-provoking articles against Trump. He is not a man usually given to confusion. He is certainly one of the best people to read on philosophy and politics.
Perhaps this is a way to understand the situation.
Problem statement: vote for Harris or Trump?
Cost Benefit Analysis:
Vote_for_Trump = Benefits_Voting_Trump - Costs_Voting_Trump
Vote_for_Harris = Benefits_Voting_Harris - Costs_Voting_Harris
If Vote_for_Trump > Vote_for_Harris then vote for Trump.
Within Huemer's Costs_Voting_Trump term is a really tiny probability of damage to the Republic multiplied by a very large cost.
Like so: Probability_of_Trump'sActions_Damaging_Republic * Cost_Damage_to_Republic.
You and I both agree that Cost_Damage_to_Republic is large, but more significantly I don't believe, and most people don't believe that the Probability_of_Trump'sActions_Damaging_Republic is high. This probability is less than 1%. So small that it doesn't manifest feelings of significant concern for me and probably most other Trump voters.
With that said, Huemer probably came up with the best case for voting for Harris. We can lament the fact that others didn't push this conversation into the debate with more poise. I suppose his contribution is more valuable than I originally realized. But I'm saying this in hindsight after Trump won.
His post was more threatening at the time. My comments were not respectfully received on his Substack. Fortunately, Huemer dealt with those commenters.
Going forward though, Huemer has still sunk a point or two on my scale of people to trust. The issue regarding the alleged coup is a perfect example. I really didn't want to dig through all the detail regard the so called coup. Much better to rely on people I trust. I called up a trustworthy and avid observer of politics and simply asked, "Do you believe Trump attempted a coup?" The answer was no and he explained why. That was in accordance with my feeling.
So, Huemer might have gained a point for effort, but will have likely lost points for being wrong about the coup threat. Time will tell though. What is the concern about Trump? That his actions will lead others to try similar and more well executed coup attempts? I don't think we can know that.
So, that's it.
“There are no solutions, only tradeoffs.”
The problem was this: vote for Harris or vote for Trump. Had the problem been vote for Huemer or vote for Trump, I would have voted Huemer.
https://arnoldkling.substack.com/p/statistical-jargon-to-use-and-to?r=nb3bl&utm_medium=ios&utm_campaign=post&triedRedirect=true
I feel the same way. Huemer's insufficiently balanced anti-Trump stuff was off-putting.
He was being unbalanced because that was a reasonable position to take. He was trying to be objective, not neutral just like for this book. Trump really is uniquely bad
Some of Huemer's comments verged into the propaganda region. I ought to go find a direct quote, but I am too lazy.
I am thinking of a vague claim that would pass the “objective” fact checkers but clearly attempts to connote more than it literally says. Discussing Trump, H said something like a court had held him liable for sexual assault. So far as I know, Trump has not been convicted or even tried or officially charged with sexual assault. If I had carefully followed the details of the case (I assume it is the porn star thing?), I would know exactly what Huemer is talking about. As it is I do not. Someone paying less attention could easily believe that the accusation is that Trump was convicted of something. If it really is worth mentioning, it seems like it is worth mentioning in a clearer way. If what Trump has actually done is bad enough, exaggerating it or vaguely mis-specifying it to sound worse just sacrifices credibility. If it is not, well, that makes matters worse. I no longer know who to believe when Trump is discussed. His enemies all exaggerate, his allies all minimize, and everyone else is justifiably confused.
That said, Huemer is well worth reading, and one of the top living libertarian philosophers. For me, there is no higher praise for a philosopher. This just illustrates that even the best make mistakes.
The problem is that by the time you get around to debunking the current set of myths, "progressives" have moved on already to lapping up a whole new load of nonsense.
To qualify as the "best book on wokeness," it really ought to spell out the irrational ideological presumptions underpinning how "progressives" and allied collectivist intellectual traditions manufacture their myths, and what sort of psychological and intellectual weaknesses such myths exploit. It then should move on to outlining the intellectual history of "progressive" and related movements to explain how we got to today's wokeness.
*Progressive Myths* sounds like a book that I would very much enjoy. I was so intrigued by the description of this book that I decided to have a look at *Ethical Intuitionism* or, at least the preview on Amazon, as the psychology of morality is one of my specialties. Unfortunately, I was terribly disappointed by Huemer's dismissal of non-cognitivism, which I find the most persuasive meta-ethical position. What is Huemer's main argument that moral statements that are indicative, truth-apt propositions rather than non-truth-apt emotional interjections or imperatives? He says that moral pronouncements represent moral truths because ordinary people have strong, intuitive feelings that their beliefs are moral truths. I'm sorry, but people have strong feelings about many things being true that are not. Ordinary people's strong intuitions about physics, evolution, probabilities, and many more phenomena are way off base. The same is true for intuitions about many psychological phenomena, including morality. Huemer claims that we should accept ordinary intuitions as valid unless we have an explanation for why they would be invalid. Well, I do. I think the invalid intuition that moral truths exist makes people more persuasive in their moral argumentation. Claiming that you should do X because "X is good" is a moral truth is probably more persuasive than claiming that you should do X because "X feels good to me" or "I order you to do X." We know that self-deception helps to make people more convincing, hence the self-deceived belief that one is in possession of moral truth.
Non-cognitivism suffers from a notorious objection called the Frege-Geach problem that he endorses. It’s a compelling objection, and non-cognitivism isn’t this super obvious position that you’re implying it is. He also doesn’t think moral claims are strong intuitively feelings, just strong intuitions like any other a priori intuition. The book goes into more detail.
I am a psychologist, not a philosopher, so perhaps I shouldn’t be getting involved in philosophical arguments. As a psychologist, I am more interested in language pragmatics than semantics. My working assumption is that language in general, and particularly moral language, evolved as a tool used by human beings to influence each others’ behaviors. While it is possible for someone to utter a purely descriptive proposition without an associated explicit or tacit agenda for influencing another person’s behavior, I think such utterances are extremely rare, existing perhaps only in the realm of philosophy and science. Even in those cases, once the philosopher or scientist tries to convince others of the truth of the proposition, pragmatics come into play. So, yes, Frege-Geach identifies a rarified case in which moral statements are treated as if they are propositions in conditional contexts. For me that is totally irrelevant to the way that moral emotions and language evolved through natural selection as a way to regulate and coordinate behavior in our species.
Is there something different about the evolution of factual claims? In that case at least, although language can certainly be used factually to manipulate others, it seems that factual claims can be true or false (but not both or neither) and that i(in those cases) it might be true that knowing the truth might be more useful than believing what is false. Hence we can argue about factual claims when there is a fact of the matter, and show evidence, etc., and it is not purely a power struggle. Why would this be different in the case of moral claims?
Depending on the purpose of making a factual claim, it may or may not serve the same function as making a moral claim. If there is an implicit "should" to a factual claim, it functions just like a moral claim. For example, "It is 0 degrees outside" can imply "You should put on your winter coat if you go outside."
Okay. But my question was, how are factual claims different? Or are you saying they are the same, and it is all just power struggle?
Sorry about the confusion. Propositions (factual claims) are indeed different from imperatives and emotional interjections (which is what I believe moral claims are) in that they are truth-apt. That is, it makes sense to discuss whether a factual claim is true or false. In contrast, it makes no sense to discuss whether an imperative or interjection is true or false because those utterances are not truth-apt. And I agree with you that knowing what is true is usually more useful than holding beliefs that are false.
By the way, I would not describe all conversations between people as "power struggles" (in which people try to make each other do things that they would rather not do). Power struggles do exist. However, conversations are also used for mutual, reciprocal influence to coordinate behavior that benefits all participants in the conversation. Think about a sports team discussing how to keep the other team from scoring. Or hunters discussing how they will surround and kill a prey animal. Or lovers discussing how to have mutually satisfying sex. Or two philosophers discussing a proposition in good faith because they both genuinely want to know the truth.
Find an illegal copy and read Chapter 2. There he devoted about 30 pages to non-cognitivist alternatives.
My expectation is that Tyler will be correct. This book is likely just preaching to the choir. How many progressives will pick up a book that challenges their world view? I'm not saying that conservatives, libertarians, populists, or anyone else would but this book probably won't reach it's intended audience. Maybe it can make non-progressives better debaters.
I'm going to challenge my left-leaning family members to read this book in exchange for reading one of their choosing. I think they will be more receptive to this style of book than an explicitly right-wing takedown of progressive ideology.
I suspect your left-leaning family members will be as unwilling to give this book a fair reading as I was The Bible, when my newly-converted Baptist friend tried to get me to read the damn thing. Even if I had read it, it would have been with a jaundiced eye, constantly looking for things to pick holes with. Still, good luck anyway.
I actually just read a review by Arnold Kling of Progressive Myths and though he was positive, he found two things to gripe about which are non-trivial. One is that Huemer attributes today’s focus on social justice to the leaders of the Rights Movement being unwilling to give up the fight, despite having won it decades ago. Kling thinks it more likely that social justice warriors see the race gap in life outcomes and conclude our society must still be racist. These two views are not the same and the latter strikes me as being more likely.
The second thing Kling points out is that Huemer doesn’t address the black-white IQ gap, which someone like Nathan Cofnas would probably claim is at the bottom of all our disagreements with progressive liberals.
For someone who is probably not as well read as many of your subscribers I found this essay quite as worthwhile and enlightening as I did the comments.
THAT good, huh? That would've been before MY comments, so you can take that last part back, if you like.
Sex differences in criminal offending actually don't explain sex differences in being fatally shot by police. If you look at racial gaps in being fatally shot by police, these are explained almost perfectly by racial gaps in arrest rates. However, men are only arrested three times as often as women (4x for violent crimes and 10x for homicide), but are killed by police 20 times as often as women!
Now, to be fair to police, it's entirely possible that this is explained by, e.g., men being more likely to act in a way that justifies shooting but doesn't show up in the available data. One clue is that men actually do kill police officers 20 times as often as women.
But it is interesting that the left threw a giant, enormously destructive temper tantrum over racial gaps that can easily be explained by differences in criminal offending while totally ignoring the gender gap that can't.
"Huemer’s Knowledge, Reality, and Value is the best introduction to philosophy."
I gotta disagree; I side with "Philosophy: a complete introduction" by Sharon Kaye.
I love this book but I agree with Tyler. Reasonable minds will be the only ones who read this book. Some opponents may, but only to use it piecemeal against Huemer. The sheeple will continue to go along to get along. The hive mind is for most incurious people their stasis. This book will however arm the few minds who do still ask questions about reality and who always demand answers and evidence to explain it. Just another great book that will be used a hundred or more years from now to show that we simply ignored the facts and denied reason and turned a blind eye as our civilization fell into chaos and ruin.
I havnt read diangelos book ”white fragility”, but based on some second hand readons on her she seems to have symptoms of cptsd
and also be doing the opposite of healthy therapy practices.
No. 4 for Tyler, is good point! Thanks.