I don’t know of anyone who says that “vegan food is invariably tastier” or “cheaper” than meat, which would obviously not be true. I’ve been vegetarian for over 30 years, but of course I admit that some meat is cheap and tastes good, and I’ve never heard of a vegetarian/vegan saying otherwise. So that’s a weird example.
I agree that was a weird example, but I think a lot is also due to the imprecise way we use language.
I'm not vegetarian, but I've never been a big fan of lots of meat. On a generic level, I'll take an unknown vegetarian meal over an unknown carnivore meal every time. For me, it is true that it is likely to be tastier, cheaper, and healthier. But, if you make it more specific and tell me my choices are al pastor tacos or a beet salad... Well then, my views on at least one of those metrics are going to change.
And, even though I can go months without eating meat, I don't describe myself as a vegetarian, except on occasion I find myself in social situations v where I'll be pressured to eat meat because few people believe me or accept the whole, "I don't like hamburgers" thing, but most accept "I'm a vegetarian."
I agree, though in trying to think of a better example, given Bryan's definition, I wonder where the lines are of what he would count as positive hypocrisy. For example, I've seen people saying things that clash with their own behavior, like advocating people not become smokers.
Saying “vegan butter tastes as good as real butter” isn’t remotely like saying “vegan food is invariably tastier and cheaper than meat.” 😂 It seems like Bryan Caplan has never talked with a vegetarian/vegan about any of these issues, so he doesn’t know what they really say. Another example is his argument that some animals — including insects — are accidentally killed in the industrial processes of making vegan food. Of course they are, but he assumes that vegetarians/vegans care only about whether animals are killed; most vegetarians/vegans care more about the conditions of an animal’s whole life (and they have a range of views on whether insects are conscious).
"If a person has a well-established track record of following onerous moral principles, their violation of one specific stated principles should make us doubt whether the person sincerely believes the violated principle."
The emphasis on sincerity as a bellwether is charmingly Caplanian, and it's a pretty good way to do moral reasoning. However, there is an alternate possibility. Rather than the violation revealing that the violator doesn't believe the principle, the violator may in fact believe in the principle with every ounce of his intellect, but merely be self-deceived into believing he does a good job of following it. That certainly leaves him in as dire a judgement as Caplan pronounces, but just getting there by an alternate path.
It's pretty fascinating that Jesus told his disciples that they should actually do what the Pharisees taught, just not copy how they actually behaved. This shows that even hypocrites can be factually correct.
The problem with trying to draw a sharp distinction between "normative" versus "descriptive" deviations from one's professed evaluative principles is that human beings have an innate psychological tendency to alter their judgments of value _ex post_ if their achievements generate misery instead of the satisfaction that was anticipated _ex ante_ when they acted upon their choice.
Ethical systems based on a choice of evaluative principles that contradict the facts of man's innate psychological nature cannot be pursued consistently even if these principles are logically consistent among themselves in a given system (i.e. they are all derived from a single unambiguous standard of value), resulting in a stressful state of cognitive dissonance when one's principles clash with innate motivations arising from one's prior experiences. On the other hand, principles that aren't mutually consistent can also generate cognitive dissonance in circumstances where the principles clash with one another.
Unfortunately, David Hume popularized the false premise that man is free to choose any final end one pleases and that a choice of final ends can't be adjudicated by any appeal to observable facts; supposedly only principles that are instrumental towards realizing the optimization of a given final end can be validated by a description of observable facts. It is Hume's false "is-ought" dichotomy is the basis for the assertion that "normative" inconsistencies are not grounded in false descriptions of reality; however, Hume's dichotomy vanishes once one realizes that the realizability of a final end depends upon the psychological facts of human nature. Ultimately, all forms of hypocrisy are based on descriptive errors at some level.
In the case of the normative assertion that "Everyone is morally obligated to be a Vegan"; one has to ask: is it a correct description of human nature to say that no human can ever optimize their personal pursuit of happiness under all conceivable circumstances by eating meat? Just one happy carnivore (like a friend of mine who insisted that "animals have a right to taste good") is sufficient to refute the alleged virtue of strict Veganism because the only coherent basis for a "moral obligation" is rooted in optimizing the feelings of the moral agent (which dictates which final end is consistently attainable by man), not necessarily in the feelings of other living organisms. That doesn't mean that one can't be happy eating a Vegan diet or more generally by empathizing with cows, pigs, chickens, etc., but it is a fallacy to assume that a lifestyle that happens to work for you is morally obligatory on everyone else. Strict Veganism is based on false analogies between cows, etc. and humans, but the evaluative principles that justice and honor among humans rises to the level of being a necessary virtue is based on far more weighty considerations than the mere emotional bonds that a human can form with their non-human pets.
The ultimate source of hypocrisy is a refusal to face the fact that one's prior choices are not in accord with the requirements of one's innate psychological nature. In the minds of many people, continued loyalty to what they incorrectly imagine to be their prime source of satisfaction becomes more important than their direct experience of what is or isn't satisfying; they resolve instances of cognitive dissonance not by admitting that their deeper principles are flawed and making the appropriate adjustments to them, but rather by rationalizing illogical deviations from their deeper principles.
Of course, some people lie about their deeper principles in an attempt to manipulate other people's behavior to their own personal advantage; this can be distinguished from the sort of hypocrisy that is a result of self-deception arising from well-meaning attempts to resolve experiences of cognitive dissonance through rationalizations. Hypocrisy, in other words, can be sincere or insincere, but in either case it is always in defiance of a truthful description of reality.
The relationship between a positive belief and behavior is not as often straightforward as you might think. E.g. there’s no contradiction at all in your first example. People tend to have sentimental attachments to places they’ve grown up in or lived in a long time. Similar to how one can believe one’s parents are bad people without disowning them. Behavior is largely a function of experience-derived emotional attachment that is unrelated to objective assessment of quality or value.
The trouble with market research is that people don't think what they feel, they don't say what they think and they don't do what they say.”
― David Ogilvy
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/9476561-the-trouble-with-market-research-is-that-people-don-t-think
I don’t know of anyone who says that “vegan food is invariably tastier” or “cheaper” than meat, which would obviously not be true. I’ve been vegetarian for over 30 years, but of course I admit that some meat is cheap and tastes good, and I’ve never heard of a vegetarian/vegan saying otherwise. So that’s a weird example.
I agree that was a weird example, but I think a lot is also due to the imprecise way we use language.
I'm not vegetarian, but I've never been a big fan of lots of meat. On a generic level, I'll take an unknown vegetarian meal over an unknown carnivore meal every time. For me, it is true that it is likely to be tastier, cheaper, and healthier. But, if you make it more specific and tell me my choices are al pastor tacos or a beet salad... Well then, my views on at least one of those metrics are going to change.
And, even though I can go months without eating meat, I don't describe myself as a vegetarian, except on occasion I find myself in social situations v where I'll be pressured to eat meat because few people believe me or accept the whole, "I don't like hamburgers" thing, but most accept "I'm a vegetarian."
I agree, though in trying to think of a better example, given Bryan's definition, I wonder where the lines are of what he would count as positive hypocrisy. For example, I've seen people saying things that clash with their own behavior, like advocating people not become smokers.
Saying “vegan butter tastes as good as real butter” isn’t remotely like saying “vegan food is invariably tastier and cheaper than meat.” 😂 It seems like Bryan Caplan has never talked with a vegetarian/vegan about any of these issues, so he doesn’t know what they really say. Another example is his argument that some animals — including insects — are accidentally killed in the industrial processes of making vegan food. Of course they are, but he assumes that vegetarians/vegans care only about whether animals are killed; most vegetarians/vegans care more about the conditions of an animal’s whole life (and they have a range of views on whether insects are conscious).
"If a person has a well-established track record of following onerous moral principles, their violation of one specific stated principles should make us doubt whether the person sincerely believes the violated principle."
The emphasis on sincerity as a bellwether is charmingly Caplanian, and it's a pretty good way to do moral reasoning. However, there is an alternate possibility. Rather than the violation revealing that the violator doesn't believe the principle, the violator may in fact believe in the principle with every ounce of his intellect, but merely be self-deceived into believing he does a good job of following it. That certainly leaves him in as dire a judgement as Caplan pronounces, but just getting there by an alternate path.
It's pretty fascinating that Jesus told his disciples that they should actually do what the Pharisees taught, just not copy how they actually behaved. This shows that even hypocrites can be factually correct.
An economist who says "I want everybody to be rich" while advocating inflation.
The problem with trying to draw a sharp distinction between "normative" versus "descriptive" deviations from one's professed evaluative principles is that human beings have an innate psychological tendency to alter their judgments of value _ex post_ if their achievements generate misery instead of the satisfaction that was anticipated _ex ante_ when they acted upon their choice.
Ethical systems based on a choice of evaluative principles that contradict the facts of man's innate psychological nature cannot be pursued consistently even if these principles are logically consistent among themselves in a given system (i.e. they are all derived from a single unambiguous standard of value), resulting in a stressful state of cognitive dissonance when one's principles clash with innate motivations arising from one's prior experiences. On the other hand, principles that aren't mutually consistent can also generate cognitive dissonance in circumstances where the principles clash with one another.
Unfortunately, David Hume popularized the false premise that man is free to choose any final end one pleases and that a choice of final ends can't be adjudicated by any appeal to observable facts; supposedly only principles that are instrumental towards realizing the optimization of a given final end can be validated by a description of observable facts. It is Hume's false "is-ought" dichotomy is the basis for the assertion that "normative" inconsistencies are not grounded in false descriptions of reality; however, Hume's dichotomy vanishes once one realizes that the realizability of a final end depends upon the psychological facts of human nature. Ultimately, all forms of hypocrisy are based on descriptive errors at some level.
In the case of the normative assertion that "Everyone is morally obligated to be a Vegan"; one has to ask: is it a correct description of human nature to say that no human can ever optimize their personal pursuit of happiness under all conceivable circumstances by eating meat? Just one happy carnivore (like a friend of mine who insisted that "animals have a right to taste good") is sufficient to refute the alleged virtue of strict Veganism because the only coherent basis for a "moral obligation" is rooted in optimizing the feelings of the moral agent (which dictates which final end is consistently attainable by man), not necessarily in the feelings of other living organisms. That doesn't mean that one can't be happy eating a Vegan diet or more generally by empathizing with cows, pigs, chickens, etc., but it is a fallacy to assume that a lifestyle that happens to work for you is morally obligatory on everyone else. Strict Veganism is based on false analogies between cows, etc. and humans, but the evaluative principles that justice and honor among humans rises to the level of being a necessary virtue is based on far more weighty considerations than the mere emotional bonds that a human can form with their non-human pets.
The ultimate source of hypocrisy is a refusal to face the fact that one's prior choices are not in accord with the requirements of one's innate psychological nature. In the minds of many people, continued loyalty to what they incorrectly imagine to be their prime source of satisfaction becomes more important than their direct experience of what is or isn't satisfying; they resolve instances of cognitive dissonance not by admitting that their deeper principles are flawed and making the appropriate adjustments to them, but rather by rationalizing illogical deviations from their deeper principles.
Of course, some people lie about their deeper principles in an attempt to manipulate other people's behavior to their own personal advantage; this can be distinguished from the sort of hypocrisy that is a result of self-deception arising from well-meaning attempts to resolve experiences of cognitive dissonance through rationalizations. Hypocrisy, in other words, can be sincere or insincere, but in either case it is always in defiance of a truthful description of reality.
What about people that say, "my vote doesnt count/matter" but continues to vote anyway?
The relationship between a positive belief and behavior is not as often straightforward as you might think. E.g. there’s no contradiction at all in your first example. People tend to have sentimental attachments to places they’ve grown up in or lived in a long time. Similar to how one can believe one’s parents are bad people without disowning them. Behavior is largely a function of experience-derived emotional attachment that is unrelated to objective assessment of quality or value.
The worst part is the hypocrisy.
So basically a performative contradiction
Excellent, original distinction!
Regards,
Bill Drissel